REAR AREA SECURITY IN THE FIELD ARMY SERVICE AREA

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U. S. Army
Command and General Staff College in partial
fulfillment of the requirements of the
degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

G. K. Otis, Major, Armor, U. S. Army

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This study evaluates the adequacy of current U. S. Army doctrine for security in the field army service area. The evaluation is based on historical experience modified by modern capabilities. A detailed analysis of the Russian Partisan movement in the rear areas of the German armies during World War II develops certain constants and parameters that remain valid independent of time. An investigation of current Soviet Army tactical doctrine identifies that country's capabilities for employing regular forces and partisans against the rear area of a future invader.

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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the individual student author and do not necessarily represent the views of either the United States Army Command and General Staff College or any other government agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)

This study evaluates the adequacy of current U. S. Army doctrine for security in the field army service area. The evaluation is based on historical experience modified by modern capabilities. A detailed analysis of the Russian Partisan Movement in the rear areas of the German armies during World War II develops certain constants and parameters that remain valid independent of time. An investigation of current Soviet Army tactical doctrine identifies that country's capabilities for employing regular forces and partisans against the rear area of a future invader. Current U. S. rear area security doctrine for the field army service area is considered to describe the size and extent of the field army service area and the concept for protecting this critical area from enemy actions. Then, U. S. rear area security doctrine is challenged by the threat exemplified in World War II and current Soviet doctrine in a three-phased test model. The evaluation of current rear area security doctrine is evolved in conclusions that identify both adequacies and inadequacies.

The World War II Russian Partisan Movement provides an historical example of large-scale guerrilla forces operating against the rear area of an army. Adequate translations of German documents, Russian reports, and prisoner of war interrogations are available to establish the characteristics of this partisan uprising. These sources yield the fact that Russian civilians behind German lines took refuge in dense forests and swamps to escape German depredations. A Soviet plea for partisan bands to form in the German rear areas was followed by aerial supply to support those who responded to the call. As the bands grew in strength, they were directed by the Soviets to attack German lines of communications and supply installations. At its peak, the Russian Partisan Movement reached a strength of 250,000 and required the employment of as many as twenty-five German divi-

sions to defend against it. The nature of the Russian Partisan Movement, the tactics used, and the German failure to counter effectively this menace provide a basis for analyzing doctrinal concepts to counter a similar threat.

Current Soviet doctrine is clearly established in Soviet military publications. Available literature indicates that the Soviet military is aware of the vulnerability of the lines of communication of a modern mechanized army. The use of paratroopers and helicopterborne forces to destroy the rear area installations of an enemy is an important part of Soviet doctrine. In addition, the Soviets plan to employ a partisan force in the enemy's rear that will operate in conjunction with their regular forces in any future war. Profiting from their studies of World War II, particularly the Russian Partisan Movement, the Soviets continue to train their soldiers for both conventional and irregular warfare; and special emphasis is given to operations in an enemy's rear area.

U. S. rear area security doctrine under CO-STAR has recently been evolved. It provides for a field army support command organization to assume territorial responsibility for the field army service area. The field army support command commander delegates responsibility for rear area security to one of his major subordinate commanders, the army support brigade commander.

Rear area security doctrine requires the area commander to coordinate unit and installation defense plans and to provide for mutual assistance in the event of attack. Each unit and installation in the field army service area is responsible for its own local defense and for preparing security plans within the policy outlined by the area commander. The doctrine excludes active air defense and operations against enemy forces large enough to endanger the command as a whole. These activities are considered to be outside the scope of rear area security. In addition, combat units are not assigned rear

area security missions unless the actual enemy threat warrants.

A three-phased model is presented to test rear area security doctrine. In general a U. S. type field army is deployed in Bellorussia in a general war environment. The first phase depicts a situation of minor guerrilla actions against the army rear area. The second phase portrays a growing partisan movement requiring combat troops for rear area security mission in the field army service area. The third phase presents a rear area threat that endangers the entire field army and requires the diversion of major tactical units to operate in the rear. Each phase of the model is presented in the form of a special situation that outlines the friendly and enemy status. The threat (either potential or actual) is established using the factors derived from the research into the Russian World War II Partisan Movement and current Soviet doctrine. Appropriate U. S. rear area commanders employ current U. S. rear area security doctrine against the actual or potential threat, and the results of the test model are discussed.

It is concluded that rear area security doctrine adequately provides for passive defensive measures such as planning and coordinating installation security measures and for integrating the units located in the field army service area into these security plans. A weakness in rear area security doctrine is its failure to provide for the timely assignment of combat units to rear area missions to counter a potential threat. Future studies of rear area security doctrine should consider revisions that will eliminate the inadequacies of current doctrine.

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INTRODUCTION

Background

"Even if we built up a tremendous stock of atom bombs and missiles, we could still lose the world for lack of a rifle."[1] This statement represented one argument against the strategy of "massive retaliation," and at the same time supported the necessity for a balanced force; but the evolution of strategy and tactics continues as technology produces new or better tools of war. The impact of nuclear weapons and the possibility of the use of outer space in warfare stir the thought and imagination of military theoreticians throughout the world. Admittedly there are basic principles of war that have not changed for centuries and remain valid even now. However, the tactics employed on the battlefield are an ever changing thing; because for every new weapon there is a counter-weapon that quickly follows.

The two major catalysts that have caused metamorphosis in tactics throughout history are old wars and new weapons. As General Gavin puts it: "The atom bomb overshadowed all military thinking during the period 1945 to 1955." He quickly thereafter asserts, however, "there was much to learn from World War II."[2] The danger to a nation lies not

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[1] Hanson W. Baldwin, "A Military Policy for the Missile Age," New York Times, 1957.

[2] James M. Gavin, War and Peace in the Space Age, (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1958), p. 92.

1

in the revision of tactics by wars and weaponry, but in the interpretations of the lessons of these catalysts. Referring to the French Maginot Line, the Paris magazine Match admitted "that blind obedience to the past led the French Army to disaster."[3] The important word in this statement is "blind" which implies more correctly an error in interpretation and hence application of the lesson demonstrated. After the atomic explosions at Nagasaki and Hiroshima there were some who claimed that "ground tactics are over - armies and tactics are worthless." Any nation adhering to this line of reasoning would only be creating another "Maginot Line" and inviting disaster. By analyzing the results of the atomic explosions in Japan and by subsequent nuclear tests, the United States has proved that armies can still fight on the battlefield. Since this is true, then the lessons learned from World War II are valid when modified by the impact of nuclear weapons. It follows, therefore, that the United States Army must keep its strategic and tactical doctrine current by careful assessment of past wars and new weapons.

Purpose and Scope

This study evaluates the adequacy of current U. S. Army doctrine for security in the field army service area. The evaluation is based on historical experience modified by modern capabilities. Specifically, a detailed analysis of the Russian Partisan Movement in the rear areas of the German armies during World War II develops certain constants and parameters that remain valid independent of time. An investigation of current Soviet Army tactical doctrine identifies that country's capabilities for employing regular forces and partisans

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[3] Washington Post, June 12, 1950; as cited in Gavin, War and Peace . . . , 95.

against the rear area of a future invader. Current United States rear area security doctrine for the field army service area is developed to describe the size and extent of the field army service area and the concept for protecting this critical area from enemy actions. Then, United States rear area security doctrine is tested against current Soviet capabilities and the parameters evolved in the analysis of the World War II Russian Partisan Movement. The evaluation of the doctrine is presented to point out strengths and weaknesses and to indicate those parts of rear area security doctrine that require further study.

The results of this study are developed within the framework of a general nuclear war between the United States and Russia. The essential condition is that a United States field army is deployed with the field army service area located inside tne boundaries of a hostile country. The evaluation of rear area security doctrine is dependent upon this condition. It is noted that a similar evaluation might produce quite different results if the field army service area were to be located within a friendly country.

In addition to the above limiting conditions, the following assumptions are used:

(1) No new weapons have been developed tnat are significantly more powerful than nuclear weapons.

(2) Any military use of outer space has not cnanged ground warfare concepts.

(3) Tactical surveillance capabilities are essentially those available in 1965.

(4) The organizational structure of the U. S. Army remains essentially as it is in 1965.

Finally it should be noted that this study has consciously avoided certain possible areas of investigation, considering them to be outside the scope of this effort. Among these are: the reaction of Soviet satellite countries to a U. S. invasion of Russia; the effect of U. S. area damage control doctrine on the field army service area; and the effects of an initial exchange of nuclear weapons strikes against U. S. and Soviet strategic targets prior to the engagement of land armies.

CHAPTER I

WORLD WAR II - SOVIET PARTISANS vs GERMAN ARMY REAR AREAS

PURPOSE AND SCOPE

German armies invaded Russia at 0300 hours on 22 June 1941 according to a detailed and rehearsed plan of operations.[1] For over three years, until July 1944, German forces battled the Russians on their own soil; and since then, these battles have received the attention of military historians probably to a greater extent than those of any other campaign in history. The strategy and tactics of both combatants have provided many valuable lessons to the student of military history. It is not the purpose of this chapter, however, to review the front line tactics of the major forces fighting the campaign; but rather its goal is to analyze the partisan movement in the German army rear areas. Through this analysis a pattern will develop which will illustrate several important features: the size of the rear area threat; the me nods used to combat the irregular forces operations; the impact of the partisan rear area actions on the major front line plans; and, most important, those factors which were present in 1941 to 1944 and which would be present again today or tomorrow for a force invading the USSR.

It will be necessary to refer frequently to the major actions

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[1] U. S. Army, The German Campaign in Russia--Planning and Operations (1940-1942), DA Pamphlet 20-261a (Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1950), p. 44. Hereafter cited as DA Pamphlet 20-261a.

5

between Germany and Russia at the front. Consequently, a part of this chapter will outline both the operations plan for the invasion of Russia and the highlights of the offensive and defensive battles fought during the three year period. In addition, certain aspects of the geography of western Russia significantly affected the partisan movement. Therefore, occasional terrain descriptions will be made where appropriate.

The primary source material used is translations of captured German Army records together with the reports prepared under the auspices of the U. S. Government. These reports involved interrogation of hundreds of German Army prisoners of war, Russian prisoners of the Germans, and Russian partisans captured by the Germans. The use of each source will be identified specifically at the time of its use, and the reference will be included in the bibliography.

THE RISE OF THE PARTISAN MOVEMENT - JULY TO DECEMBER 1941

The western border of Russia may be generally considered in three areas from South to North: the Ukraine, White Russia (or Bellorussia), and the Baltic States (map A).[2] The Ukraine area, extending from the Black Sea to the Pripyat River located in that great natural obstacle of the dense Pripyat marshes, was the "breadbasket" of Russia. It was characterized by broad unforested steppes and a generally poor road and rail net. White Russia on the other hand, had a better road and rail net and was astride the invasion route that led most directly to the capitol of Russia and its largest industrial center, Moscow. The northern area with Leningrad as

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[2] Ibid., p. 3.

GENERAL REFERENCE MAP
OF EASTERN EUROPE

Map A

both the principal industrial center and the communications center, lay in the north and on the path of any route to seize the critical Russian port city of Archangel. It was in these three general areas that the German Army High Command devoted its attention in "BARBAROSA", the code name for Directive 21 which ordered the invasion of Russia.[3]

War at the Front

The final plan for Operation "BARBAROSA" envisioned a single envelopment in the north aimed at Leningrad; a double envelopment in the center directed first at Minsk, then Smolensk; and double envelopments in the south to seize Kiev initially, then the Dnieper Bend and hence isolate the Ukraine. It was recognized that swift thrusts to penetrate the Russian defenses were essential. This would allow the numerically inferior German armies to cut off the Russians in Eastern Europe, deny them the chance to prepare defensive lines within European Russia, cause the Russians to fight to the rear, and provide the Germans the best opportunity for a rapid seizure of Moscow (map B).[4]

To implement "BARBAROSA" the Germans assigned three army groups corresponding to the three geographic areas already mentioned: Army Group North with twenty-nine divisions, Army Group Center with fifty-one divisions, and Army Group South with thirty-eight divisions, leaving twenty-four divisions in reserve. Thirty-three divisions would come from Finland and Rumania to bring the total to 175 divisions for the start of the campaign.[5] As already noted, the invasion began on

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[3] Ibid., pp. 22-25.   [4] Ibid., p. 36.

[5] Charles V. P. von Luttichau, Guerrilla and Counterguerrilla Warfare in Russia During World War II (Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1963), p. 11.

THE FINAL PLAN
FOR OPERATION BARBAROSSA

Map B

22 June 1941. By 5 December 1941 the German offensive had carried
from Leningrad in the north to Moscow in the center and to Rostov in
the south. However, these three key cities were still in Russian
hands, and the German offensive was nearly out of breath (map C). At
this time the rear of each of the three German Army Groups was deep
within European Russia, and lines of communication were both highly
vulnerable and difficult to protect.[6] With this cursory treatment of
the planning and first operational phase of the German eastern front
campaign, it is desirable to turn to the rear areas where a "front
within a front" was forming, and to record in more detail the rear
area actions occurring there.

Uprising in the Rear

It should be clear at the outset that neither the rise of the
partisan movement nor its overall effect on the German rear areas was
primarily responsible for Germany's defeat in Russia. However, the
contribution that partisan actions made to the overall Russian effort
must be recognized; especially in the light of understanding why the
partisan movement occurred, what was its composition, the extent of
partisan operations, and the degree to which these operations influ-
enced the battle in the front. "The Soviet Partisan Movement . . . .
was, in both conception and scope, the greatest irregular resistance
movement in the history of warfare".[7]

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[6] DA Pamphlet 20-261a, p. 86.

[7] Edgar M. Howell, The Soviet Partisan Movement 1941-1944, DA
Pamphlet 20-244 (Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1956),
p. 203. Hereafter cited as DA Pamphlet 20-244. Throughout this paper,
partisan warfare, guerrilla warfare and irregular warfare will be used
synonymously to denote the actions of partisans (guerrillas) and any

SITUATION ON
5 DECEMBER 1941

German Thrusts
German Positions
Russian Thrusts
Russian Positions
Finnish Positions
Romanian Positions
Hungarian Positions
Armored and Motorized Units

100   50   0   100
MILES

GULF OF FINLAND

LENINGRAD
Leningrad

VOLKHOV

EIGHTEENTH

Ljuban

LAKE PEIPUS

oPskov

LAKE ILMEN

NORTHWEST

SIXTEENTH
Staraya Russa
Demyansk

NORTH

Valdai Hills

Kholm

Ostashkov

KALININ
Kalinin

Velikaya Luki

Toropets

Rzhev

THIRD PANZER

NINTH

FOURTH PANZER

Bely

Sychevka

Volokolamsk

Krasnaya Polyana

Moscow

Vitebsk

Vyazma

Mozhaysk

WEST

Smolensk

Maloyaroslavets

FOURTH

Kaluga

Sukhinichi

Tula

SECOND PANZER

CENTER

Orel

SOUTHWEST

Gomel

SECOND

Kursk

Voronezh

Kiev

Belgorod

Volchansk

SOUTH

SIXTH

Kharkov

Poltava

Don R.

SEVENTEENTH

Izyum

Kirovograd

Dnepropetrovsk

Artemovsk

Voroshilovgrad

SOUTH

Stalino

CAUCASUS

FIRST PANZER

Don R.

Odessa

Taganrog

Rostov

SEA OF AZOV

BLACK SEA   CRIMEA

Kerch

ELEVENTH

Map C

The date of the beginning of the Russian Partisan Movement can be said to be 3 July 1941. On this date Joseph Stalin outlined the necessity for and the basic objectives of partisan warfare when he stated:

> Partisan units, mounted and on foot, must be formed; diversionist groups must be organized to combat the enemy troops, to foment partisan warfare everywhere, to blow up bridges and roads, damage telephone and telegraph lines, set fire to forests, stores, transports. In the occupied regions conditions must be made unbearable for the enemy and all his associates. They must be hounded and annihilated at every step and all their measures frustrated.[8]

The majority of the people in the German occupied areas of Russia might readily have ignored Stalin's plea for partisan warfare; since the Communist Party per se had little appeal in the western border regions. Cognizant of this fact, Stalin called upon the individual's love of homeland - his patriotism - as the motivation for action. Evoking sympathetic response by this device, Stalin not only avoided the divisive result of an appeal to the Communist Party but also succeeded in uniting party and non-party members in a common cause. Nevertheless, popular uprising was slow and at times painful. The Red Army, however, was quick to react with instructions and planning guidance for erstwhile partisans. On 20 July the Commander of the Russian Northwest Front, Major General Sobechikov, published a lengthy list of detailed requirements in a document entitled <u>Instructions Concerning the Organization and Activity of Partisan Detachments and Diversionist Groups</u>.[9] It is both

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regular armed forces that are performing similar operations in an enemy's rear area.

[8] Joseph Stalin, <u>The Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union</u> New York: International Publishers, 1945), pp. 9-17.

[9] War Documentation Project Staff, <u>Selected Soviet Sources in World War II Partisan Movement</u>, A report prepared by the Human Resources Research Institute (Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama: Air Research and

interesting and important to note that even at this early date influence was brought to bear on the partisans by the Red Army; and, as shall be illustrated, this influence was eventually to extend to direct tactical cooperation. Of further pertinence is the fact that General Sobechikov gave specific instructions for both tactics and organization. Some of his orders shed light on actions to follow and are summarized below:

(1) Operate in forested areas against main lines of communication.
(2) In Red Army occupied areas, the NKVD (People's Commissariat of the Interior) and NKGB (People's Commissariat of State Security) offices must organize "destruction battalions" to protect the Red Army rear against enemy airborne troops. If these areas are captured by the Germans, the destruction battalions will remain and become partisans.
(3) Utilize ambushes and raids; destroy railroad and highway bridges, and use horses or foot to stay more mobile than roadbound vehicles would permit.[10]

Hence it is true that within the first month of the German invasion, the Soviet hierarchy had ordered both its civilian and military population to resort to irregular warfare behind the German lines. It is also true that the Germans had early knowledge of the Russian plans to organize partisan warfare. On 14 July for example, the Germans took a document from a Soviet courier whose plane had made a forced landing. The document was enroute from the Political Commissar of the Northwest Front intended for Moscow and reported the organization of twenty-two

---

Development Command, 1954), pp. 3-9, document number 1. This report consists of the translation of over 100 Soviet documents and some comments concerning them. It is one of several reports (most of them by one or more identified authors) accomplished under the code name of "Project Alexander". Hereafter this report will be cited as Selected Soviet Sources . . . , Project Alexander.

[10] Ibid., pp. 5-7.

partisan units operating in Luga, Velikiye Luki, and Bologoye areas.[11]

Near the end of July in the vicinity of Smolensk, the Germans picked up

another Russian document outlining the organization and functions of

the previously mentioned destruction battalions.[12] Despite these

facts, the Germans failed to make a decisive move against the partisans

during the first three months of operations.[13]

There is ample evidence to describe the Russian Partisan Move-

ment in all three of the geographic areas of European Russia. However,

the nature of the terrain in Bellorussia (the area of operations for

German Army Group Center and Russian Army Group West) provides the

best breeding ground for irregular warfare; and for this reason most

of this investigation will refer to that area. Polotsk, Smolensk,

Bryansk, and Minsk became centers of large partisan bands operating both

independently and in conjunction with the Red Army.[14] The partisan ac-

tions in the Dnieper Bend area of Army Group South and in the Lake Il-

men area of Army Group North will be discussed only briefly to show the

difference from the actions in the Center.

The partisan movement in the rear of Army Group Center grew

from three general sources: (1) bypassed Red Army units who avoided

capture and organized or joined partisan bands (By the summer of 1942

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[11]Ibid., pp. 12-13.   [12]Ibid., pp. 13-14.

[13]Ralph Mavrogordato and Earl Ziemke, The History of the First
Bellorussian Partisan Brigade, A report prepared by the Human Re-
sources Research Institute (Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama: Air
Research and Development Command, 1954), p. 7. Another Project Alex-
ander report.

[14]Earl Ziemke, The Soviet Partisan Movement in 1941, A report
prepared by the Human Research Institute (Maxwell Air Force Base,
Alabama: Air Research and Development Command, 1954), p. 25. A Pro-
ject Alexander report.

this element was the largest single increment of partisan strength.),

(2) Communist Party members who were overrun by attacking German forces

or deliberately introduced there, (3) civilian men and women indigenous

to the area of operations who organized and joined the bands as a means

of self-preservation or because of their nationalistic convictions.[15]

There is some evidence to indicate another category - partisan units

trained and created by the Russians during peacetime and then introduced

as a nucleus for partisan organizations in an enemy's rear.[16] This lat-

ter is really a part of (1) and (2) above, and may certainly be most

significant in the future. In July 1941 when the Germans occupied the

Smolensk area, the groundwork for partisan activity had already been

laid as noted above by the documents captured by the Germans.[17] At this

same time a large part of the Russian 214th Airborne Brigade was infil-

trated on foot through the Smolensk front and operated in civilian

clothes in the German rear while their commander made several trips back

and forth for conferences with Soviet officials. Two more companies of

the same brigade were dropped behind the front in mid-August to act as

partisans and organize partisan detachments from Red Army stragglers,

homeless civilians, and Communist Party sympathizers.[18] The following

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[15] Earl Z mke, Composition and Morale of the Partisan Movement,
a report prepared by the Human Resources Research Institute (Maxwell Air
Force Base, Alabama: Air Research and Development Command, 1954), pp. 1-8.

[16] Col. Branislav Rapos and Lt. Col. Rndr Jiri Kousak, "Warfare
in Mountains", Our Army, trans. ACSI, Department of the Army (Prague,
Czechoslovakia: 1958), pp. 151-153.

[17] Selected Soviet Sources . . . , Project Alexander, document
number 5, pp. 13-14.

[18] Gerhard L. Weinberg, The Partisan Movement in the Yelna-Doro-
gobuzh Area of Smolensk Oblast, A report prepared by the Human Resources
Research Institute (Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama: Air Research and
Development Command, 1954), p. 14. A Project Alexander report.

comments from a captured partisan radio operator illustrate the sig-
nificance of this part of the early partisan buildup:

> After the destruction of the 145th and 149th
> Divisions in the vicinity of Roslave, many
> groups of the battered units remained in the
> forests behind the German front. They were
> collected near Pochinok by a Captain (Shemov)
> presumably an officer of the 214th Airborne
> Brigade and organized into partisan detach-
> ments.
>
> The unit with which he is familiar con-
> sists of approximately 180-220 men; it is di-
> vided into three groups of about sixty men
> each.
>
> The first group was sent off to be em-
> ployed in the area south of the Smolensk-Doro-
> gobuzh road . . . .
>
> The second group to which he himself be-
> longed . . . was sent over the Smolensk-Doro-
> gobuzh road to make contact with parachutists
> who had landed there and to organize partisan
> units in the Dukhovshchina area (about ten
> miles northeast of Smolensk) . . . .
>
> The third group went from Pochinok . . .
> to Velizh . . . . It is supposed to organize
> partisan units in the Velizh area and also to
> establish contact with the numerous partisans
> of Bellorussia . . . .
>
> Each of the above-named groups has two
> radio transmitters, plus a submachine gun per
> man, explosives, and hand grenades. Weapons
> and explosives are dropped by planes with which
> the groups are in communication . . . . The
> groups themselves do not go into action as com-
> plete units but have the assignment of organiz-
> ing new partisan groups of five to ten men
> each . . . . Basically their immediate assign-
> ment is not the committing of acts of sabotage
> since the result would be that individual units
> would come to the attention of the German Army.
> Their assignment is rather the formation of a
> complete and coherent organization behind the
> German front. Acts of sabotage . . . are under-
> taken only when they can be done thoroughly and
> when the group can be certain of escaping cap-
> ture.
>
> . . . .
>
> Until the capture of this partisan, con-
> tinuous radio communication existed among the
> three groups and with the Soviet Army and planes.
>
> The individual partisans usually work on
> collective farms in the daytime. The purpose of
> their work, however, is not to earn bread but to

recruit and organize partisan groups and to
encourage others in resistance and sabotage.

. . . .

The population supports the partisans
to a very large degree (<u>in weitestgehendem</u>
Masse). They supply them (the partisans)
with the best provisions, slaughter for them,
give them white bread, hide them, and help
them on their way.[19]

By October 1941, four months after the German invasion, there
are two distinct parts of the partisan picture in the rear of Army
Group Center. One scene is exemplified by disorganized pockets of
by-passed units and Red Army stragglers. This element is further
characterized by vigorous attempts of the Red Army to organize the
remnants in order to regain control. The other scene is a conglomera-
tion of homeless refugees and Communist Party members conducting spor-
adic raids when success seemed assured. Integrated efforts between the
retreating Red Army and these partisan forces had not yet been achieved.

Now the picture changes. From early October until early De-
cember (the time that the German offensive bogged down) the Germans
were forced by tactical necessity to begin mopping up actions in the
pockets formed as a result of their gigantic pincers which had suc-
ceeded in cutting off thousands of Red Army soldiers.[20] In the rear of
Army Group Center, a Commander of the Army Group Rear Area Center was
responsible for security of the rear, and each Army within the Army
Group had a Commander of the Rear. Regularly assigned "security divi-
sions" were provided to each Army Group Rear Commander. A security
division had actually the approximate strength of a reinforced regiment
and was normally further assigned to the Army rear area. Early in a
campaign, additional combat forces would be attached to the rear com-

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[19] <u>Ibid</u>., p. 15.   [20] <u>Ibid</u>., p. 16.

mands for mopping up actions, then moved up to the front again as the
tactical situation dictated.[21] Thus, when German orders were issued
on 10 October 1941 to clear the pockets behind Army Group Center, sev-
eral divisions were assigned to the rear area commands at Army level.
The clearing actions by these divisions were largely successful in
that they were able to capture thousands of Red Army soldiers and force
the remainder, as well as the small partisan bands, deep into the for-
ests and swamps which were prevalent in the area. For examples of the
results, the 255th Division reported 2,236 prisoners by 23 October and
1,294 others by 17 November. The 137th Division meanwhile reported a
total of 15,200 prisoners in their operations. It is of further sig-
nificance that the Army rear area commanders reported little or no par-
tisan activity during this period. However, the situation at the front
was not progressing according to German plans; and more fighting divi-
sions were needed there. Therefore, despite reports by the rear area
commanders which indicated that there were still many significant poc-
kets of Russians remaining, the combat units were called back to the
front leaving only small, second-rate units for security in the rear.[22]

Thus, another scene emerges in the rear of the German armies
during October and November: concentrated German actions to eliminate
Russian pockets resulting in some success but coupled with a retreat
into hiding of sizeable numbers of partisans and potential partisans; a
period of little actual partisan activity and certainly none that dir-
ectly affected the war effort at the front. There is however, an omi-
nous note present in the situation. With the remnants of the Red Army

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[21]DA Pamphlet 20-244, pp. 12-15.

[22]Weinberg, The Partisan Movement in the Yelna . . . , 18-19.

taking refuge in the abundant forests and swamps in the area, the oppor-
tunity was created for organizing and equipping, for planning and pre-
paring what was to become a "front within the front." A German secur-
ity division in the rear of Army Group Center submitted this report on
4 December reflecting its evaluation of partisan actions for the month
of November:

> Partisan activity consisted exclusively
> of raids on villages for provisions and winter
> clothing and of construction of winter shelters.
> Planned attacks on individual vehicles of the
> armed forces or guards of the billets did not
> occur. There were few instances of sabotage--
> interruptions of telephone communications ex-
> clusively. On the other hand, it has been es-
> tablished that the partisans now attempt to
> terrorize all Russians who collaborate with the
> (German) troops, e.g., members of the indige-
> nous auxiliary police, mayors, [kolkhoz]collec-
> tive farm chairmen. The partisans took part
> in actual combat only when they were attacked
> and could no longer avoid it.[23]

As 1941 drew to a close and as the German offensive ground to a halt,
a new phase of the invasion occurs, and with it, a new phase of parti-
san activity. It is necessary at this point to return to the front and
review the campaigns there before continuing the outline of partisan
activities in the rear.

THE GROWTH OF PARTISAN WARFARE - JANUARY TO JUNE 1942

War at the Front

The situation at the front on 5 December 1941 marks the depth of
the German penetration into Russia (map C). The Russians still held
Leningrad, Moscow, and Rostov on the Sea of Azov. The Russian armies
had been falling back on shorter and shorter lines of communication

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[23]Ibid., p. 16.

while the German Army was now spread over a much extended front with
nearly 1,000 miles of its lines of communication located in enemy
territory. German reserve forces were now cut to a meager handful,
and the Russian winter with temperatures as low as -50^{0}F. played
havoc with poorly prepared men and equipment. Under these conditions,
and utilizing their large reserve of manpower (albeit untrained), the
Russians launched a winter offensive. The offensive began with thrusts
from Moscow and grew into a general offensive all along the front.
Realizing initial success, the Russians pushed hard against stubborn,
nearly fanatical, German defenses. By February, the Russian attack had
run its course, and the front became relatively stable from March until
late June as both opponents tried to recover from the heavy losses they
had sustained due to battle and weather (map D).[24] Note that German
Army Group Center consists of six armies: Ninth, Third Panzer, Fourth
Panzer, Fourth, Second Panzer, and Second; situated from north to south
as shown on map D. It is in this area once again that partisan activity
is most significant and representative.

War in the Rear

While the German armies faced what they estimated to be ap-
proximately four and a half million Russians along the front, they also
began to feel that "fear and hatred inspire the Russian only to fight
with courage of dispair."[25] Meanwhile the buildup of partisan strength

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[24]DA Pamphlet 20-261a, pp. 97-142.

[25]"Actual Strength of Committed Russian Forces as of February
1942", a report prepared by the Intelligence Section, Foreign Armies
East Branch, German High Command, trans. The Directorate of Military
Intelligence, Canadian Army Headquarters, Ottawa, Canada, undated.
(Mimeographed.)

GULF OF FINLAND

SITUATION IN
MID-JANUARY 1942

Russian Thrusts
Russian Drives
German Positions
Russian Positions
Rumanian Positions

100   50   0   100
MILES

LENINGRAD
VOLKHOV
NORTH
EIGHTEENTH
NORTHWEST
SIXTEENTH
KALININ
THIRD PANZER
WEST
FOURTH PANZER
CENTER
SECOND PANZER
SOUTHWEST
SECOND
SOUTH
SIXTH
SEVENTEENTH
SOUTH
FIRST PANZER
CAUCASUS
ELEVENTH
CRIMEA

Lake Peipus
Lake Ilmen
Lake Ladoga

Sea of Azov

Map D

in the rear was becoming alarming. Reports from the Commander of
the Rear Area of Fourth Army indicated tremendous growth of partisan
activity in his area during the period 23 February to 8 March 1942.[26]
Two deserters from the partisans interrogated by the Germans confirmed
that Red Army parachutists were being dropped to organize partisan re-
sistance.[27] By June 1942 a type of organization had emerged. The
partisans were formed into detachments and the detachments into bri-
gades (or regiments depending upon the accuracy of the translations
used from Russian to German then to English). At any rate, a detach-
ment consisted of from thirty to 150 men while a brigade usually con-
trolled several detachments resulting in a brigade strength of 1,000
to 1,500 men.[28] In many instances smaller elements operated as teams
without much higher echelon control. In any case, the partisan organi-
zation and strength varied with the area, the German efforts to elimi-
nate the partisans in that particular area, and the local leaders.[29]
A reliable report of overall partisan strengths shows that from a total
of 30,000 on 1 January 1942, the partisan movement grew to 150,000 mem-
bers by the summer of 1942.[30] In some areas this strength was suffi-
cient to challenge the rather meager German rear area forces; in other
places the partisans resorted entirely to guerrilla warfare. In the
rear of Army Group Center, examples of both of these type actions oc-
curred.

[26]Weinberg, The Partisan Movement in the Yelna . . . , 24-25.

[27]Ibid., p. 25.

[28]Kurt De Witt and Wilhelm Moll, The Partisan Movement in the
Bryansk Area, 1941-1943, A report prepared by the Human Resources Re-
search Institute (Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama: Air Research and
Development Command, 1954), p. 13. A Project Alexander report.

[29]Ibid., p. 14. [30]Ziemke, Composition and Morale . . . , 9.

The rear of the German Fourth Army lay astride the rail line
from Smolensk southeast to Bryansk. Much of the partisan activity was
centered on the nearly 150 miles of railway. East of Smolensk lay Yelna
and Dorogobuzh. On February 15 the partisans captured Yelna isolating
a German garrison there. On 13 March the partisans occupied Dorogobuzh.
These actions cut major lines of communication between Army Group Center
rear, Fourth Army rear, and the front. Weak attempts by rear area com-
manders to eliminate partisan pockets were unsuccessful, and resulted
in the German Army High Command ordering major forces to be diverted to
rear area security. Even these forces required from 19 March 1942 until
late May to regain only parts of this area, and at the expense of many
casualties.[31] There were several partisan regiments operating through-
out the rear of Army Group Center. Chart 1 illustrates the organiza-
tion of one of these regiments, the Shabo Regiment (named for its com-
mander). The strength of the Shabo regiment reached approximately
1,000 by May 1942 and was still growing at the end of June 1942. There
were several other regiments of varying sizes operating in this area,
but the Shabo is a typical one.[32] From the foregoing account, it is
apparent that the partisans in the Yelna area were organized along
conventional military lines and were extremely effective.

A rather different type partisan action played havoc with the
Second Panzer Army farther south in the Bryansk area. Here, smaller
partisan bands attacked lines of communication ambushed trains and
motor vehicles, and meted out punishments to civilians suspected of col-
laborating with the Germans. These actions demonstrated to the indige-

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[31] Weinberg, The Partisan Movement in the Yelna . . . , 31-39.

[32] Ibid., pp. 42-52.

Chart 1. – Organization of the Identified Units of the

Partisan Regiment Shabo

nous population the inability of the Germans to cope with the partisan bands.[33] In one instance, the partisans literally annihilated a German engineer battalion by derailing the battalion's troop train west of Bryansk and killing the dazed survivors of the wreck.[34] Sabotage raids on German installations and convoys and attacks on railroads and highways were a constant source of irritation to the Germans.[35] Only fifteen miles east of Bryansk, a railway construction company was repairing rails blown out by the partisans. When the Germans sent a patrol to reestablish contact with the construction company, the entire repair crew was found dead due to partisan attack.[36] German concern began to mount. The spring of 1942 was approaching and with it the thaws which turn roads into impassable quagmires. Under this condition, the German armies would become more critically dependent on the railroads for resupply and troop movements. Thus, it was of no little concern to the commander of the rear areas that partisan activity was increasing in great bounds.

Farther east and deeper in the rear of Army Group Center lay the Polotsk lowlands. Here too the partisan bands were active. Beginning in March 1942 and rapidly increasing each month, partisan attacks against the railroads soon became significantly dangerous to the Germans. Then,

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[33]De Witt and Moll, The Partisan Movement in the Bryansk . . . , 8.

[34]Ernst von Dohnanyi, "Combatting Soviet Guerrillas", Marine Corps Gazette, 39 (February, 1955), 50-61. The author of this two-part article was a former German Army officer who had personal experience against the Russian partisans in World War II.

[35]U. S. Army, Rear Area Security in Russia, The Soviet Second Front Behind the German Lines, DA Pamphlet 20-240 (Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1951), pp. 24-25. Hereafter cited as DA Pamphlet 20-240.

[36]Ibid., p. 20.

on 1 May 1942 Stalin issued an order calling for even more partisan attacks on transportation and communication facilities[37] (apparently to aid in hindering the forthcoming German summer offensive). The partisans' reaction to this message was quickly felt by the Germans.[38]

TWO YEARS OF WAR IN THE REAR - JULY 1942 TO JULY 1944

Partisan Tactics and Effects

It is clear, now, that the birth of the partisan movement occurred during the period July to December 1941. From December 1941 to the beginning of the German summer offensive on 28 June 1942, the partisans tested their strength, gained experience, and grew in stature. Yet, the results attained by the partisans during these periods of birth and growth were hardly more than harassments to the German war machine. During the next two years, however, from June 1942 until the major Russian offensive on 23 June 1944, the partisan movement reached maturity. The partisans played a part in Soviet strategy, interferred with German operations, and caused the Germans to commit major forces in anti-guerrilla operations. The accounts to follow will serve to determine the limitations as well as the successes of the partisan movement during the two years mentioned above. Before proceeding however, it should be noted that this investigation will adopt a slightly different approach. Instead of a chronological presenta-

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[37] Ralph Mavrogordato and Earl Ziemke, The Partisan Movement in the Polotsk Lowland, A report prepared by the Human Resources Research Institute (Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama: Air Research and Development Command, 1954), p. 49. A Project Alexander report.

"Stalin Order No. 130, 1 May 1942

"Male and female partisans are ordered to increase partisan warfare in the rear of the German occupying forces, to destroy telephone and telegraph communications and the enemy's means of transportation, and to spare not a bullet in the struggle against the oppressors of our fatherland."

[38] Ibid., p. 49.

tion of the actions at the front followed by an account of the partisan actions in the rear areas, the front and the rear will now be treated concurrently. The emphasis, of course, will be on partisan actions. Only occasional necessary references will be made to the war at the front; since the operations conducted there are no longer so essential in understanding the war in the rear.

The Germans launched a summer offensive in June 1942. The Russians suspected such a move well in advance and ordered an increase in partisan activity.[39] In the Ukraine between Kiev and Kursk, partisans increased efforts against rail lines. In the northern sector (Baltic) partisans attacked rail and highway bridges, small German Army detachments, and military installations. In the rear of Sixteenth Army, for example, thirty bridges, twenty locomotives, and 113 railroad cars were destroyed; while rails were broken in eighty-four places causing 1,129 hours of interrupted service. All this occurred in the three month period 1 May to 31 July 1942.[40] In the vicinity of Smolensk, the area of Army Group Center, an example of partisan activity is furnished by a document captured from the Grishin Regiment operating there. Armed with weapons and equipment hidden by the Red Army as it retreated from this area in 1941, the Grishin Regiment reported killing over 2,700 Germans, destroying 182 vehicles, derailing twenty-seven trains, and mounting several other types of actions during the period April to November 1942.[41] Despite the number of attacks made and the amount of damage inflicted, evidence indicates that the partisans did not directly influence the tactical situation.[42] On the other hand, the

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[39]DA Pamphlet 20-261a, p. 134.   [40]DA Pamphlet 20-244, p. 94.

[41]Selected Soviet Sources . . . , Project Alexander, 120-121.

[42]DA Pamphlet 20-244, p. 95.

more than one thousand partisan actions conducted in the rear of the Second Panzer Army between May and October 1942 resulted in assignment of another security division to this area indicating that partisan activity was certainly significant.[43] The partisans were also of significant value in obtaining intelligence for the Red Army. There are numerous examples of transmission of intelligence reports on German movements and locations by the partisans to the Red Army.[44] Another example of partisan activity occurred in the vicinity of Vitebsk. Here was a thinly held area in the German lines which the partisans attacked causing it to become a corridor to the German rear. Partisans actually kept this corridor open until the spring of 1943.[45] During the fall of 1942 partisan strengths continued to grow and their activities increased. In October a partisan unit destroyed twelve miles of track in the vicinity of Bryansk by simultaneously attacking all the guard details, blowing the track in 178 different points, and "demolishing some 2,400 continuous sections of trackage."[46] The partisan strength behind the Second Panzer Army in the Bryansk area was estimated at 19,000 men in November 1942.[47]

During the period from late fall 1942 until the spring of 1943 a reorganization and rebuilding of the partisan movement was accomplished. The purpose was two-fold: first, to bring the movement under more direct and integrated control as a Soviet auxiliary force; and second, to put new

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[43]Luttichau, Guerrilla and Counterguerrilla Warfare . . . , 102.

[44]Kurt De Witt, The Role of the Partisans in Soviet Intelligence, A report prepared by the Human Resources Research Institute (Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama: Air Research and Development Command, 1954), pp. 18-23. A Project Alexander report.

[45]Mavrogordato and Ziemke, The Partisan Movement in the Polotsk . . . , 11.

[46]DA Pamphlet 20-244, p. 95.   [47]Ibid., p. 96.

leadership into an organization which had lost much of its initial Red

Army leaders as a result of German anti-partisan actions.[48] Nevertheless,

partisan attacks continued. While the Russian Air Force bombed the sup-

ply lines, the partisans cooperated by attacking supply dumps and bridges.

In March 1943, a double span railroad bridge across the Desna river south-

west of Bryansk was destroyed when the partisans made a night attack on

the platoon guarding the bridge. Loss of this key bridge blocked the main

line to all traffic for five days.[49] The Chief of Transportation, Army

Group Center, reported 1,392 incidents for August 1943, and complained

bitterly that a 600 man Russian security detachment went over to the parti-

sans.[50] These actions were typical of those experienced within the entire

rear area of the German Army.

When the Germans launched their short-lived offensive on 5 July

1943, the bands once again made their contribution. On 22 July partisan

action on the north-south rail line through Bryansk blocked traffic for

forty-eight hours. Two ammunition trains, a fuel train, and a trainload

of critical "Tiger" tanks were destroyed between Minsk and Gomel.[51] The

strongest attack of this period occurred on the night of 2-3 August when

10,900 demolition charges and mines were set on the rail lines of the cen-

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[48] Ibid., ￼. 137 and p. 161.   [49] DA Pamphlet 20-240, p. 29.

[50] Ibid., p. 26. At this time there were over 110,000 Russian rail-
road men employed by the Germans in the sector of Army Group Center alone.
In addition, the Germans were using many "eastern volunteer units," com-
posed of indigenous people, to act as security detachments. During the per-
iod of German successes at the front, it was not uncommon to find large num-
bers of the local inhabitants willing to cooperate with the German occupation
forces. However, as the Soviets gained in tactical success and partisan ac-
tivity became strong, many of these security detachments transferred their
allegiance back to the Russians. See: Ziemke, Composition and Morale
. . . , 6.

[51] DA Pamphlet 20-240, p. 162.

tral sector.[52] Throughout September partisan pressure continued and was directed primarily against rail lines, roads, and bridges. Pressure was also applied against supply dumps, communication facilities, and individuals who dared to collaborate with the Germans. Attacks were planned to coincide with Russian advances and German withdrawals, and caused extremely critical situations in the rear of Army Group Center which was still the area of primary partisan concentration.[53] After a lull in October, partisan activity increased again in November and December. The estimated partisan strength at this time, December, 1943, was placed at 200,000 men and would decline to about 150,000 by June 1944.[54]

Throughout this investigation, the rear of Army Group Center has been the focal point of greatest partisan activities. During the period January 1944 to June 1944, however, a significant increase in guerrilla warfare occurred in the rear of both Army Group North and Army Group South. The rear of Eighteenth Army, part of Army Group North, reported partisan attacks against railroads and lines of communication. Strong Russian Army attacks against the front lines forced the Germans to move security divisions from the rear areas to the front. The weakened German rear area forces permitted the partisans to mass in sufficient strength to attack German reserves and hinder their movement. As a result, partisan activities in the rear of Army Group North "played particular havoc with all operational and logistical movement in the whole army area and had the effect of at least hastening the decision by some days."[55] In the south, the increased guerrilla effort was neither so great nor so effective; but it nevertheless hindered German lines

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[52]Ibid., p. 163. [53]Ibid., pp. 166-171.

[54]Ziemke, Composition and Morale . . . , 9.

[55]DA Pamphlet 20-244, p. 185.

of communication.[56] By May and June the partisans concentrated on reconnaissance and intelligence activities. They operated with Soviet strategic intelligence teams who forwarded the information to the Soviets directly or through the partisan radio net.[57]

In the summer of 1944, the Soviets were prepared to launch their offensive designed to break the back of the German occupation. Through direct contact with the partisans, coordinated plans had been prepared and orders issued. The great blow came on the night of 19-20 June when partisans set off 9,600 demolitions on rail lines. When the Soviets launched their main attack on 23 June, the partisans aided the effort by hitting specific targets and finally by joining Red Army units as the partisan areas were uncovered by the attacking Soviets. When the Soviet forces reached the western borders of Russia, partisan activity as such had completed its course.[58]

German Counter-Measures

The foregoing account of partisan activity has been concerned chiefly with the actions of the bands and their cooperation with the Red Army. Little space has been devoted to the German efforts to counter the guerrillas; yet several important lessons are to be learned from their successes and failures in these operations. At the outset, the Germans failed to plan properly for the contingency that they certainly knew existed.[59]

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[56]Ibid., pp. 192-193. [57]Ibid., p. 191. [58]Ibid., pp. 201-202.

[59]Herbert Golz, Hans Reinhardt and Helmuth Kreidel, Battle Experiences Against Guerrillas - Critical Situations in the Rear of Army Group Central, Early 1942. Combatting the Guerrillas in Central Russia, trans. ACSI, Dept. of the Army, 6 February 1963. (Mimeographed.) On page 139 of this document the authors state: "Even though certain preparations by the USSR for guerrilla warfare were known to the Germans prior to their invasion of the USSR, timely preparations for counter measures were neglected. No one had been given command responsibility for counterguerrilla operation. . . . "

Then, when it became known that the partisan movement was beginning (as early as July 1941), the Germans apparently still felt that the speed with which they would conquer Russia would negate any concern over direct partisan action. Rear area security was treated as a function of logistics,[60] and the established security divisions received their operational directives from Gen Qu (Army Chief of Supply and Administration).[61] Gen Qu was responsible for supply, security of lines of communication, and military government in areas behind the Army,[62] or what would be the service area of an American field army (called KORUEKE by the Germans). Hitler's early reaction to Stalin's call for partisan warfare was: "this partisan warfare also has its advantages: it gives us the opportunity to . . . exterminate . . . all who oppose us."[63] As a result, "throughout 1941 the German High Command thought only in terms of intensifying terror, which was directed not against the partisans but against the population as a prophylactic measure."[64] Captured and occupied territory was to be administered and exploited only for the purpose of supplying the German armies and the German nation.[65] Therefore, even though initially "the local inhabitants were generally cooperative everywhere," and primarily wanted to get back to peaceful living under German occupation,[66] the harsh treatment they received quickly turned them against the Germans. Due largely to this ill conceived and ex-

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[60]Ziemke, The Soviet Partisan Movement in 1941, 64.

[61]DA Pamphlet 20-244, p. 10.   [62]Ibid., pp. 10-12.

[63]Ziemke, The Soviet Partisan Movement in 1941, 65.

[64]Ibid., p. 65. The Germans issued an order in October 1941, an extract of which read: "The fear on the part of the indigenous populace of German countermeasures must be greater than the threats of the roving Bolshevik remnants."

[65]Ibid., p. 66.   [66]DA Pamphlet 20-240, p. 14.

tremely harsh policy, the Germans created a breeding ground for a seething partisan uprising.

During the fall of 1941 some offensive anti-partisan operations were initiated by the Germans (earlier German actions were defensive in nature). In the Ukraine, the 1st SS Brigade moved against the partisans in the Dnieper Bend, but they were relieved by the 444th Security Division and called to the front before the job was done. These actions resulted finally in clearing a pocket of some 350 partisans, but it required seven battalions to do the job.[67] In March 1942 in the Yelna area, the 707th Infantry Division was committed against a partisan concentration. It killed 3,500 people, of which the minority were actually partisans, and left the area as a permanent seat of hatred against the Germans. Operation "Munich" consisted of three divisions under a corps headquarters supported by air and took nearly two months to open up the Yelna-Dorogobuzh area.[68] In May 1942 Operation "Vogelsgang" in the northern area was conducted by two infantry and one armored regiment. This operation succeeded in killing or capturing over 1,600 partisans, of a total of approximately 2,500. As a result it was successful from one point of view.[69] However, by May 1943 it was necessary to mount Operation "Freischuetz" with two divisions and two regimental combat teams in this same area. The results of "Freischuetz" were the death or capture of 2,000 of the 3,000 partisans. Back in the southern sector behind Army Group Center, a number of large scale anti-partisan operations were conducted. The most notable of these, "Nachbarhlife", by two division-sized task forces, lasted

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[67]Luttichau, Guerrilla and Counterguerrilla Warfare . . . , 40-44.

[68]Weinberg, The Partisan Movement in the Yelna . . . , 34-36.

[69]DeWitt and Moll, The Partisan Movement in the Bryansk . . . , 52.

[70]Ibid., p. 54.

one month and succeeded in breaking up the bands in the area and destroying

or capturing nearly 1,000 partisans. The largest anti-partisan operation in

the Bryansk area, "Zigeunerbaron", lasted three weeks in May-June 1943 and

utilized six German divisions.[71] These large scale German anti-partisan

operations did much to neutralize the partisan effort in the rear, but this

was accomplished only by using large numbers of front-line forces sorely

needed in the actual combat zone. For example, a reliable estimate of Ger-

man manpower figures indicates that in 1943 and 1944 there were between 200,

000 and 250,000 security forces in the German rear.[72] Clearly, then, the

partisan movement in the German rear was a force that exerted a significant

effect upon the war in Russia.

OTHER CONSIDERATIONS

There are also additional aspects of the partisan movement that

should be noted. The use of Soviet airpower, for example, tends to show

another facet of Soviet support of the partisans. Already mentioned was

the use of air to drop "organizers" behind the German lines to establish a

military or para-military organization. Besides this, the Soviets resorted

to aerial resupply of the partisans in many areas. They brought in food,

weapons, ammunition, and medical supplies and brought out casualties, in-

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[71] Ibid., p. 56.

[72] War Documentation Project Staff, The Soviet Partisan Movement in
World War II: Summary and Conclusion, with Selected Bibliography and Glos-
sary, A report prepared by the Human Resources Research Institute (Maxwell
Air Force Base, Alabama: Air Research and Development Command, 1954), p. 7.
A Project Alexander report, hereafter cited as Project Alexander, Summary
and Conclusions. In connection with the quoted figures it must be noted
that this total security force strength was not by any means composed only
of manpower which could be used at the front. A large part were indigenous
auxiliaries of questionable loyalties, older men who were not fit for com-
bat, etc. On the other hand, their use as security forces denied them for
use as productive labor manpower pools.

telligence information, and leaders (to attend conferences and training schools in the rear). Also, planes were used to supply propaganda to the partisans aimed at the partisans themselves, at the civilian population, and at the German forces (including collaborators).[73] The morale factor of air support to the partisans and to the civilians of the occupied countries should not be underestimated, especially during the period of Russian defeats and withdrawals.[74] The economic area is another example of partisan interference with German plans. As noted earlier, partisans lived in forests and swamps and hence were able frequently to deny the planned use by the Germans of critically needed lumber. Further, partisan "requisitions" on the local economy for food forced the Germans to import this essential rather than to depend on local procurement.[75] Finally, the political influence of the partisans must be noted. Nearly every partisan band had its political officer (Politruk). By keeping party ideology alive within the band, as well as by fighting as a band member, the Politruk accomplished an important task even though actual Communist Party members were a small minority of most bands.[76] In addition, the special training camps for partisans (begun

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[73]Alexander Dallin, Ralph Mavrogordato, and Wilhelm Moll, Partisan Psychological Warfare and Popular Attitudes Under the German Occupation, A report prepared by the Human Resources Research Institute (Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama: Air Research and Development Command, 1954), pp. 1-66. A Project Alexander report. Also see: Gerhard L. Weinberg, The Role of Airpower in Partisan Warfare, a report prepared by the Human Resources Research Institute (Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama: Air Research and Development Command, 1954), pp. 1-25. A Project Alexander report.

[74]Ziemke, Composition and Morale . . . , 28.

[75]Project Alexander, Summary and Conclusions . . . , 11. The statement is particularly true in the center and northern areas. In the south (Ukraine), partisan activity was not very effective in this respect.

[76]Ziemke, Composition and Morale . . . , 3-4.

in August 1941) had a share in the political indoctrination of their students.[77]

This investigation of the partisan movement would not be complete without at least a brief mention of two other anti-partisan movements. One of these, the Kaminsky Brigade, met with considerable success but ended in failure; the other, the Vlasov Movement, failed to get off the ground because the Germans distrusted its use; yet it might have produced significant results.

The Kaminsky Brigade began as an ambitious venture by a dissatisfied leader, Voskoboinikov, located in Lokot', in the Bryansk area. After his area was occupied by the Germans in 1941, Voskoboinikov became leader of a "police force" with tacit approval of the local German commander. Since he was an avowed anti-Communist, Voskoboinikov fought against the partisan movement in his area. Killed in action on 7 January 1942, he was succeeded by Kaminsky, an anti-Bolshevik. By October 1943, Kaminsky, who controlled 6,000 soldiers and 25,000 civilians, was moved by the Germans to a partisan-held area in the vicinity of Lepel'. The Kaminsky Brigade was given a military mission in this new area. In Lokot' the Brigade had been a significant help to the Germans in keeping the area relatively free of partisans. At Lepel', however, the harsh policies and looting of the Brigade alienated the population and made the Kaminsky's less than effective for the Germans. With the Russian advance

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[77] John Armstrong and Kurt DeWitt, _Organization and Control of the Partisan Movement_, A report prepared by the Human Resources Research Institute (Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama: Air Research and Development Command, 1954), p. 14. Also see: General Staff of the Red Army, _Collection of Materials for the Study of War Experiences, No. 8, August - October 1943_, trans. Directorate of Military Intelligence, Army Headquarters, Ottawa, Canada (Moscow: Military Publishing Agency of the People's Commissariat of Defense, 1943), p. 174. Also see: Bruce McClure, "Russia's Hidden Army; Hitler Was Sure of Victory - Until He Realized Germany Faced Not One Soviet Army, But Two", _Infantry Journal_, 65 (August, 1949), p. 16. Bruce McClure's article was based on material given to him by an anonymous German citizen who used captured Russian documents and reports prepared by German generals as his source.

in 1944, Kaminsky was moved to quell an uprising in Warsaw, Poland. His ruthlessness there was so great that he was murdered by the Germans and his Brigade disbanded. Thus ended what was for a time a valuable anti-partisan rear area aid to the Germans.[78]

Unlike the Kaminsky Brigade, the Vlasov Movement amounted to little more than a propaganda campaign aimed at the partisans by the Germans and with questionable results. General Andrei Vlasov of the Red Army was well known for his agricultural reforms and in 1941 for his part in the defense of Moscow. Captured in July 1942, he used his name on propaganda leaflets issued by the Germans to aid in combatting the partisans. He also made appearances in partisan infested areas on behalf of the Germans.[79] By 1944 Vlasov was put in charge of all captured Russian troops who were willing to fight on the German side (Vlasov Army). But by this time, German earlier reluctance to such a move had negated whatever value this movement might have had if it had been employed sooner.[80] Once again it appears that the Germans erred in their utilization of potential resources much as they did in their administration of occupation policies.

<div align="center">DISCUSSION</div>

The accounts in this chapter are summarized as follows: (1) the rise of the partisan movement and its missions; (2) partisan tactics and co-

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[78] Alexander Dallin, The Kaminsky Brigade: 1941-1944 - A Case Study of German Military Exploitation of Soviet Disaffection, A report prepared by the Human Resources Research Institute (Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama: Air University, 1952).

[79] Dallin, Mavrogordato, and Moll, Partisan Psychological Warfare . . . . , 31-34.

[80] Leonard Shapiro, "Political Background of the Russo-German War", The Red Army, ed. B. H. Liddell Hart (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1956), pp. 95-99.

operation with the Red Army; (3) the effects of the partisan movement on
the campaign; and (4) the anti-partisan measures employed by the Germans.
It is in these areas that most may be learned for application in the future.

Rise of the Partisan Movement - Its Missions

It seems clear from the evidence that partisan warfare was planned
in advance by the Soviets as a part of their overall strategy. It is
equally clear that ill conceived German occupation policies were a signifi-
cant factor leading to the size and extent of the partisan movement. Even
with the use of trained Red Army organizers dropped into the German rear,
the natural tendency of the population to return to peaceful pursuits would
have greatly reduced the numbers who went into the ranks of the partisans.
However, Stalin's appeal to Russian love of land and country, reinforced by
the desire for self-preservation and a growing hatred of the tyrannical in-
vader, induced thousands of Russians to resort to guerrilla warfare. The
large numbers of Red Army troops cut off in the German rear were also a
significant early factor that swelled partisan ranks and provided a compe-
tent nucleus for leadership as well as for training in irregular warfare.
Soviet partisan schools played their part in contributing to the rise and
organization of irregular bands. After the partisans had formed and could
begin raids for reasons other than supporting themselves, they were assigned
missions: procure intelligence for the Red Army; attack German lines of com-
munication, installations and even German forces; and discourage collabora-
tion with the Germans.[81] Several effects resulted from the execution of

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[81] 1st Lt. Larry L. Wolff, "The Soviet Partisan Movement," _Military Review_, 35. (May, 1955), pp. 44-47. 1st Lt. Wolff, who has done consider-
able research in the area of Russian partisan warfare, lists a fourth mis-
sion: to reestablish the Communist Party in occupied areas. This author
considers that as an effect rather than an assigned mission of the irregular
bands, and a small effect at best.

these missions, a discussion of which is presented on page 40.

Partisan Tactics and Red Army Cooperation

The second general area mentioned above is that of partisan tactics and partisan cooperation with the Red Army. The tactics used by partisans varied from all-out conventional attacks on German units (such as those in the Vitebsk Corridor) to small unit ambushes on routes of supply. Organizations like the Grishin Regiment were capable of defending villages such as Yelna and Dorogobuzh which made it necessary for the Germans to employ sizeable forces to dislodge them. On the other hand, it is quite apparent that by far the bulk of partisan tactics amounted to mobile forces hitting critical areas by surprise, overcoming the guards, carrying out their assigned task of destruction, then melting quickly into forests and swamps. The open terrain in the southern sector together with the relatively small and ineffective partisan activity there tend to emphasize the large part that favorable terrain plays on partisan warfare. The night raid, the ambush, demolitions exploding in several areas at once, key bridges blown up, and terrorism: these are the tactics of irregulars today and were the tactics of Red partisans during 1941 to 1944. Of even greater significance, however, was the cooperation by partisans with the Red Army. It has been shown that the Red Army provided organizers and leadership for the movement. Directives were issued by the Red Army and later by the Soviet Partisan High Command behind the Soviet lines. Training schools were set up and even manuals printed[82] to aid the partisan movement. Soviet airpower was diverted to aid the partisans, and the partisans in turn provided the Red Army

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[82] Ibid., p. 16. Notebook for Partisans, Handbook for Partisans, and Instructions of the Central Staff of the Partisan Movement are some of the Soviet publications which Lt. Wolff mentions.

with a great amount of valuable intelligence.[83]   The massive attacks against German rail movements coinciding with Russian Army offensives in 1943 and 1944 point up once more the cooperation between the conventional and unconventional forces. It is evident, then, that there was a significant amount of coordinated action directed by the Soviet High Command which produced a form of relationship between the front and the front behind the front.

The Effects of the Partisan on the Campaign

The effects of partisan warfare are not so readily susceptible to summary as one might expect. Statistics on manpower used by the Germans to combat the menace, and other statistics on the size of the movement itself all must be qualified by their source and its accuracy. It is also noted that statistics alone are not always a valid measure of effectiveness. For example, Capt. N. Galay (an extremely reliable source) concludes that there were fifteen German field divisions, ten security divisions, twenty-seven police regiments, and 144 police battalions employed by the Germans against the partisans in the autumn of 1942. He further points out that twenty-five field divisions of the Axis Powers were likewise employed in the autumn of 1943 (this number represents 10% of the 257 divisions belonging to the Axis Powers on the eastern front.)[84] This investigation has already shown that between 200,000 and 250,000 security forces were used by the Germans in 1943 and 1944 to attempt to secure their rear areas. It can be said,

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[83] General Staff of the Red Army, Collection of Materials . . . , 137.

[84] Captain N. Galay, "The Partisan Forces," The Red Army, ed. B. H. Liddell Hart (New York: Harcourt Brace and Company, 1956) p. 157. The author, Capt. Galay, is a military historian and journalist, a former Russian Army and French Foreign Legion Officer, and a member of Vlasov's Army in 1941-1945.

therefore, that one effect of the partisan movement was to require employment of large forces to combat the menace. In the same light, the fact that the partisan movement reached a strength of nearly 200,000 during its height is prima facie evidence of a requirement for a large counter force.

The disruptive effects of partisan actions against communications and means of transportation are also not easily measured, but certainly this was a significant result of partisan activities. Germany was required to expend a huge amount of resources to keep open its lines of communications. For example, all railway road beds were cleared of forest and crops to a distance of 300 yards on either side; and wooden guard towers were spaced along the cleared area every 400 to 600 yards.[85] If one considers only the labor and materials necessary to accomplish this (not to mention security forces for all installations and railroad repair crews with necessary materials) then it becomes evident that partisan efforts resulted in an enormous manpower drain on the resources available to the Germans. Yet, of even greater impact was the slowing and even halting of the great supply line from Germany to the eastern front. One cannot refer to a particular battle and claim that partisan action was responsible for its outcome; but a great degree of flexibility was certainly denied to the German High Command by the extent to which their supply and communications lines were disru... ed by guerrilla actions.

Another particularly illusive quantity is the measure of partisan intelligence efforts. In the early stages of the movement, information about the German rear and troop movements served primarily as an aid to the partisans themselves. Later, as the Russian Army was able to move from a delaying and defensive posture to an attacking posture, the information relayed

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[85] Ibid., p. 153.

to the Soviets by the partisans was important. Information of major troop movements to and from the front or laterally, and of large supply buildups were valuable additions to Soviet intelligence. Then, by late 1943 and throughout 1944 the partisans acted to provide a base of operations and a communications link for trained Soviet intelligence agents. Once again, without alleging that the outcome of the campaign depended on partisan intelligence work, it is nevertheless certain that their efforts in this respect were a significant contribution to Red Army operations.

There are still other aspects of the partisan movement which have been revealed in this chapter. The strength of the bands in some areas took a potential labor source away from the Germans. In addition, because the partisans were in many cases supported by the general population, people were not amenable to German occupation which in turn required larger village occupation forces and a resulting greater drain on German manpower. It has also been shown that the partisans resorted to terrorizing any erstwhile collaborators which undoubtedly discouraged many from indulging in this pursuit. Additionally, the partisans, by their presence in large numbers, denied raw materials such as lumber, foodstuffs, and grain to the Germans forcing the enemy to resort to import rather than local procurement.

A discussion of the effects of the partisan movement would be neither accurate nor complete by listing only those results favorable to the Russians. It must also be noted, for example, that the Russians were forced to divert men and supplies in significant quantities to organize, train, equip, and maintain the partisan bands. The use of Russian airpower in the logistic support role for the movement represented a diversion of this important military resource from the struggle at the front. A most important thought, however, is this: if the partisan movement had a strength of nearly 200,000 at one time, why is it not possible to show that this large "army" was respon-

sible for winning an important battle by direct military action in conjunction with the Front? A discussion of this question would necessitate an investigation of the psycho-social factors of the people involved, a project beyond the scope of this paper. But it may be stated that a force of the size known to have existed in the German rear certainly had a greater military potential than was demonstrated by the partisans. As a result, the effect of the partisan movement as a military force was not as significant as it might have been.

German Anti-Partisan Measures

The last area of prime interest is that of German counter measures to combat the guerrillas in the rear. The first attempt, i.e. a harsh occupation policy of intimidation and terror, served to alienate the population of occupied Russia. Instead of becoming an anti-partisan measure, German occupation policy helped to drive the villagers into the forests and swamps to avoid German depredations. Once away from their homes, people found it a matter of self-preservation to form or join bands and eventually to become partisans. The Germans then turned to a defensive policy of local installation protection and the use of military forces called security divisions. However, security divisions were most often formed of individuals who were unfit for the rigors of front line service. It was soon discovered that security divisions were less than adequate in most areas. Eventually, the rear area commanders had to be assigned front line combat forces especially trained for guerrilla fighting.[86] Finally, the German Army and

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[86] By May 1944 the German High Command had special counter-guerrilla schools in operation. In a pamphlet signed by General Jodl, Chief of the Armed Forces Operations Staff, a detailed analysis of the necessity for mobility and communications in anti-partisan forces is emphasized. Jodl further points out in the pamphlet that encirclement of partisan areas by trained forces, a subsequent squeezing of the enclosed bands with a conse-

Army Group Commanders were forced to mount large scale operations, such as "Freischuetz" and "Nachbarhilfe", in order to destroy and disperse the partisan bands. These latter operations met with some success and managed to neutralize the partisan menace in the areas concerned for some time thereafter. Local successes were realized by such activities as the Kaminsky Brigade and by "Vlasov's Army"; but these measures were not exploited fully by the Germans, and hence they failed to attain the proportions they might have. German efforts aimed at the partisan movement were thus primarily defensive, often costly in men and materials, and only occasionally successful. As a whole they did help to prevent a more successful employment of this auxiliary by the Soviets.

CONCLUSIONS

The same four categories used previously to facilitate the discussion provide a sound framework upon which to outline the resulting conclusions. First, there were several factors which contributed to the growth of the partisan movement. Most significant among these were:

(1) Soviet positive measures to organize and to control the people in the occupied areas.

(2) The suitable nature of the terrain.

(3) By-passed elements of the Red Army who were not properly "mopped up" by the Germans.

(4) Harsh treatment of the people in occupied areas by the German forces.

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quently smaller diameter circle, and complete annihilation is necessary in located partisan areas. See: German Army Pamphlet, Fighting the Guerrillas, trans. Intelligence Division, General Staff of the U. S. Army, 1944 (German Armed Forces Operations Staff, Chief General Jodl, 1944). (Mimeographed.)

The significant consequence of these factors was a mammoth rear area threat to the German armies.

Second, the partisan bands cooperated with the regular forces. Employing what have now become familiar guerrilla tactics, partisans supported the Red Army in several ways. They collected and reported military information, provided a base of operations for regular intelligence agents, and increased their raids and attacks in conjunction with major Soviet offensives. Only rarely, however, were the partisans effective in a conventional military role.

Third, the effects of the partisan movement fall into three broad areas: military, economic, and political psychological. Militarily, the Soviets benefited most from partisan intelligence reports. Although the partisans were able to disrupt German supply lines and to necessitate the employment of German forces in rear area security missions, these effects were perhaps not so significant as they might have been. Economically, the principal contributions of the partisans lay in denying manpower (labor), foodstuffs, and lumber to the Germans. The Ukraine area is an exception to this conclusion, however. The political-psychological activities of the partisan served to prevent collaboration, to aid in keeping the population from extensive cooperation with the Germans, and to demonstrate that German rule in the occupied areas could be flaunted with some success.

Fourth, it is concluded that German countermeasures in the partisan-infested rear areas were too little and too late. Although some large scale counterguerrilla operations met with modest success, the Germans approached the occupation of Russian territory with an untenable policy. The invaders realized this fact too late, employed inferior forces in passive defensive measures as a usual thing, and frequently did more to foster than to eliminate the partisan movement by their inadequate countermeasures.

The above conclusions point unerringly toward certain parameters
that are relatively independent of time and that presage a potential par-
tisan movement in the rear area of a force invading the Soviet Union in the
future. These parameters are:

(1) A large number of people remain in the invader's rear
areas to include indigenous civilians and Red Army soldiers separated from
their units.

(2) Suitable terrain exists for the conduct of irregular war-
fare. Forests and swamps abound and provide an excellent breeding ground
for guerrillas.

(3) A partisan force uses guerrilla tactics. The hit and run
raid, ambushes, and the use of demolitions on lines of communications are
most effective for a non-conventional force without a large supply base.
This parameter assumes increasing importance considering the possible guer-
rilla use of nuclear weapons.

(4) Missions are assigned and supplies provided by centralized
Soviet authority in order to direct and support a partisan movement.

(5) Partisan rear area operations are planned to support the
regular forces. The intelligence capability of the partisans in reporting
major troop movements and locating likely nuclear targets is a significant
factor with resp ct to this parameter.

The military doctrine of any nation fighting in Russia must be designed to
effectively offset these parameters. Otherwise, that nation may encounter
the same war in the rear that menaced the Germans. In chapter IV, U. S.
rear area security doctrine will be tested against these parameters from
Russian history. First, however, a look at current Soviet doctrine will
enable one to ascertain whether or not partisan warfare is a part of the de-
fense plan of the Soviet Union in a war of the future.

CHAPTER II

THE SOVIET THREAT TO AN ENEMY'S REAR AREA

The nature and extent of partisan warfare revealed in the preceding chapter have established a precedent for Soviet actions in an enemy's rear area. It is the purpose of this chapter to investigate current Soviet tactical doctrine aimed at the rear areas of an invader in Russia. The tactical nuclear strike on supply installations or on operational reserves is recognized as a major destructive force. However, this tactic, as well as large scale combat in rear areas resulting from maneuver by major enemy formations, is not a part of this investigation. Essentially, then, the current Soviet doctrine of interest here will be limited to irregular forces and to regular forces with rear area missions that are not directly a part of the battle at the front.

It should be noted at the outset that the Soviets are not neglecting preparations for nuclear war. Since World War II the Red Army has been reorganized and modernized. Garthoff points out:

> Soviet preparation for tactical nuclear warfare
> extends to training of the troops, development
> of corresponding doctrine, and of course procure-
> ment of the various forms of mobile weapons, trans-
> port and communications.[1]

V. D. Sokolovskii's book Soviet Military Strategy gives its reader a detailed view of current Soviet thinking in the nuclear age. Furthermore, because we know that the Soviets use official periodicals to publish current

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[1]Raymond L. Garthoff, Soviet Strategy in the Nuclear Age, (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1958), p. 165.

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doctrine,[2] review of the index of <u>Military Herald</u> or <u>Military Mind</u> (both published in Moscow) provides a clear picture of progressive and continuing military thought in the Red Army. Combining the above ideas with the character of the Russian soldier who "shows great initiative in infiltration, in tactical ruses and deception, and in improvisation,"[3] it is clear that the backward Soviet Army of 1941 is a modern Soviet Army in 1965.

Regular Forces

The Soviet ground forces are organized into armies, divisions, regiments, and battalions. On the tactical battlefield, the rifle (or mechanized) divisions are employed to break through the enemy's defenses and the tank divisions exploit the breakthrough. The impact of nuclear weapons has not destroyed the Soviet's belief in the importance of infantry.[4] Col. Ely's fictitious General Alexandrov reaffirms this as he says "future war, atomic or otherwise, will see the Soviet foot soldier leading the attacks."[5] But this is not to say that the Red Army will fail to use every modern technique of warfare and tactics. For example, the Soviets have worked hard to improve their airborne capability and doctrine. Techniques, equipment and aircraft have been improved and much training has been conducted in this area.[6] Two of the missions of the tactical airborne force are of particular interest here: (1) "Disrupt enemy rear area activities and destroy stocks of ammunition and fuel"; (2) "Seize tactical airfields, bridges, and other

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[2] U. S. Army, Handbook on the Soviet Army, DA Pamphlet 30-50-1 (Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1958), pp. 93-94. Hereafter cited as DA Pamphlet 30-50-1.

[3] Ibid., p. 82   [4] Ibid., p. 22.

[5] Colonel Louis B. Ely, The Red Army Today, (Harrisburg, Pennsylvania: Military Service Publishing Co., 1953), pp. 14-15.

[6] DA Pamphlet 30-50-1, p. 33.

tactical objectives [nuclear delivery means?]."[7] These airborne missions are not just "paper doctrine", however, they are a reality of current training. Lt. Col. Dobrovolskiy in 1962 wrote that a Guards company on a training exercise was dropped at night "deep in an enemy's rear" with the missions of destroying a "control center" and a rocket base. His description of the company's actions gives an interesting insight to the realistic training being accomplished in this area.[8] The Soviets also plan to use helicopters to introduce troops into enemy rear areas. Garthoff writes quoting Major General Pokrovsky in Military Herald:

> General Pokrovsky declared that the wide use of helicopters' will lead in the near future to significant changes in the character of military transport and the tactics of troops operating in the enemy's rear . . .'.[9]

Once in an enemy's rear area, it is planned that the airborne force will execute its missions; and then either be picked up, link up with ground forces,[10] or revert to guerrilla warfare if the first two fail. Some airborne units have even been given special guerrilla training.[11] In any event it appears valid that "the Russians have already made up their mind that . . . airborne troops will play the leading part in the rear of the enemy."[12]

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[7]Ibid., p. 34

[8]Lt. Col. A. Dobrovolskiy, "In the Rear of the Enemy", Military Herald, No. 12 (December, 1962). Trans. ACSI, DA, Washington, D. C. In this article the Soviet officer points out that the company dropped 3.5 km. from its objective, had main and alternate assembly areas in woods, and the platoon leaders were given detailed instructions by the company commander. It is interesting to note that the company commander was able to use two of his platoons to hold off "enemy" troops while his third platoon executed the primary mission.

[9]Garthoff, Soviet Strategy in the Nuclear Age, 161.

[10]DA Pamphlet 30-50-1, p. 34.   [11]Ely, The Red Army Today, 114.

[12]Colonel-General Curt Student, "Airborne Forces", The Red Army, ed. B. H. Liddell Hart (New York: Harcourt Brace and Company, 1956), p. 383.

Another tactic of the regular forces which has an enemy's rear area as its goal is ground infiltration. It was mentioned above that the Soviet soldier is adept at infiltration. During World War II, infiltration by regular forces into the German rear was used successfully by the Russians. The dispersed battlefield envisioned in a nuclear war and the fluid conditions expected to exist will provide a lucrative opportunity for infiltration tactics. During the winter months and especially in the north, the Soviets are prepared for tactical infiltration. Col. Gorbunov makes generous reference to the infiltration techniques used in World War II; and then says that the "experience of exercises testifies to the fact that in modern conditions t e role of small units, operating on skis, not only has not diminished, but even grew [sic]." He further states that platoons and companies were used for rear area operations.[13] It follows, then, that the Soviets will take advantage of dispersion on the nuclear battlefield in order to infiltrate units whose missions lie in the rear areas of the opponent.

Th re is another technique which the Red Army has used before and plans to employ again: that is, by-passed army units. The German Army's pincer movements developed large pockets of Red Army soldiers during World War II, and many of those soldiers became guerrillas when the Germans failed to clear the pockets completely. There is ample evidence to indicate that Soviet soldiers today are taught how to operate as guerrillas. Department of the Army pamphlet on Communist Guerrilla Tactics states that if a Communist Army is beaten it is taught to break up into small groups who then revert to guerrilla warfare.[14] This same concept is stated by Col. Ely who says:

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[13]Colonel N. Gorbunov, "Skiers in the Rear of the Enemy," Military Herald, 1 Moscow, January 1963, trans. ACSI, Dept. of the Army, pp. 32-36.

[14]U. S. Army, Communist Guerrilla Tactics, DA Pamphlet 30-40, p. 29. Hereafter cited as DA Pamphlet 30-40.

> The cardinal rule emphasized in the military
> regulations is that from the smallest unit up-
> ward, there must be no retreat. If the sur-
> rounded unit can exist no other way, then it
> must revert to partisan existence.[15]

Finally, a quick perusal of the titles of the articles appearing each month

in the USSR's VOYENNYY VESTNIK (Military Herald) provides an insight into

the direction the Red Army is taking concerning action in an enemy's rear

area. July 1964 issue - "Artillery Battalion in the Depths of the Enemy's·

Defense," "Answer to a Tactical Problem. Airborne Company Destroys an Ob-

jective in the Enemy's Rear"; January 1964 issue - "On Skis in the Enemy's

Rear."

In assessing the threat to an invader's rear area by regular Soviet

forces, the conclusions reached indicate three sources: (1) airborne or

airmobile units; (2) ground infiltration of small tactical units; (3) by-

passed ground units. The missions assigned these forces can range from

seizure of key terrain to the destruction of lines of communications, nu-

clear delivery means, or supply installation. Although none of these mis-

sions are likely to have a decisive effect on the front line battle; never-

theless, any one of them can cause serious disruption for an attacking army.

If in addition one were to give the relatively small force the capability

of carrying and employing atomic demolitions to accomplish its mission, then

the significance of this type of action takes on even greater proportions.[16]

There is, however, another aspect of Soviet doctrine which may even more

drastically affect the rear areas, and that is partisan warfare.

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[15] Ely, The Red Army Today, p. 15.

[16] This author has no knowledge of a current ADM capability of the
Soviet Union, hence this is merely a conjecture. It is certainly not with-
out merit, however, to assume that a progressive nuclear power has the capa-
bility of producing small yield atomic demolition munitions.

Irregular Forces

It is generally known that the Soviets began an outward and rather extensive change in their military thought beginning in late 1954 and early 1955 with the public rejection of Stalin's military dogma. Hence, it is appropriate to consider whether or not the Soviets still promote the use of lessons learned from World War II (the Great Patriotic War, as it is referred to by official Soviet semantics). If in fact the military powers in Russia still adhere to learning from past experiences, then one might conclude that any future defense of their homeland will feature the planned use of partisans. If not, then there would be room for conjecture. The true state of affairs is that the Soviets are firm believers in using the lessons of World War II as modified by the availability of current weapons. In addition, they are planning and preparing for the extensive use of irregular warfare against the rear of a future invader in a nuclear war. What follows is offered to substantiate these conclusions on the basis of current Soviet sources and military writers of other nations:

> Soviet soldiers are taught that the . . . guerrillas
> will organize a second front in the U. S. rear to
> support the Red Army. On D-day these irregular
> forces will start unconventional warfare . . .
> Soviet field manuals and directives to communist
> parties preach the use of unconventional warfare
> to the utmost.

This appeared in the May 1962 issue of The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science.[17] Marshal Sokolovskii had this to say:

> The military preparation of the population [the pre-
> ceding in italics] under present conditions is ex-
> tremely important, and not only to replenish the
> Armed Forces during war. A militarily trained

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[17] Slavko N. Bjelajac, "Unconventional Warfare: American and Soviet Approaches," The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences, 341, May, 1962, pp. 74-81.

> population can be enlisted in organized com-
> bat . . . Moreover, the population in po-
> tential military theaters must be ready for
> determined partisan operations against indi-
> vidual enemy formations invading our terri-
> tory.

Sokolovskii goes on to say that the general population should be taught as much as possible about modern infantry weapons and the methods of operation of the enemy.[18] Robert F. Delaney, writing for the United States Naval Institute, points out that in the "Sino-Soviet bloc, ambitious training programs have been initiated to instruct the youth and the mass of workers in elements of irregular warfare."[19] The French Colonel Nemo emphasizes that

> the place of guerrilla action in war is a
> choice place. Its rise to such a place, to-
> gether with the atomic fact, dominates the
> transformation of war in the present era.

An anonymous "former Soviet-Russian officer," now living in Germany asserted that it is certain "in a military clash of major proportions, partisan action would play a far greater role than it did in World War II."[21] Walter Darnell Jacobs quotes Lt. Gen. S. Krasil'nikov:

> In wars of imperialism against the camp of
> socialism, the creation in the rear of the
> imperialistic front, where it will be possi-
> ble, of a 'partisan front' will be character-
> istic.[22]

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[18] Sokolovskii, *Soviet Military Strategy*, 461.

[19] Robert Finley Delaney, "Unconventional Warfare", *Guerrilla Warfare*, United States Naval Institute (Wisconsin: George Banta Co., Inc., 1963), p. 6.

[20] Colonel Nemo, "The Place of Guerrilla Action in War", *Military Review*, November, 1957, pp. 99-107. Trans. from *Revue Militaire Générale* (France, January, 1957).

[21] Anon, "Atomic War and Partisans", *Military Review*, XXXVII, June, 1957, pp. 105-108. Trans. from *Deutsch Soldaten-Zeitung*, (Germany, November, 1956)

[22] Walter Darnell Jacobs, "Irregular Warfare and the Soviets", *Military Review*, XXXVIII (May, 1958), p. 6.

It is certainly clear from these assertions that the Soviets intend to re-sort to partisan warfare to defend their homeland in a nuclear war, and even more important they are preparing for this kind of action in advance. More will be said about advance preparations in a later section. But what about Soviet use of World War II experience?

A partial insight to the answer lies in a perusal of the published organs of military thought in the Red Army. It is a fact that VOYENYY VESTNIK begins each current issue with a section devoted to lessons learned from the "Great Patriotic War" written by Red Army officers of all ranks. In addition, it appears to be a set procedure for the author of any tactical problem appearing in this periodical to begin with an account of an experience from World War II before launching his outline of the modern problem.[23] The U. S. Army also takes the official position that World War II experience has a significant impact on Soviet thought.[24] The importance of establishing this fact lies in evaluating the impact that historical precedence is likely to have on future Soviet actions. For example, there is little published information about detailed Soviet plans for the actual use of partisans. However, once it has been established that the Soviets plan to use partisans and that the Red Army leans heavily on the results of World War II, then it will follow that the parameters evolved in Chapter I are valid as indicators for a future war on Soviet territory. At this point it seems valid to assert that current Soviet military thought is influenced to a large extent by the experiences of the past war as modified, of course, by the tactical employment of today's modern weapons.

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[23] See, for example, the Department of the Army translations of VOYENYY VESTNIK for 1963 and 1964 in the CGSC library archives under card reference number 18603.26.

[24] See, for example, DA Pamphlet 30-50-1.

Other Considerations

This investigation would not be complete in its discussion of the rear area threat without at least reference to several factors which will undoubtedly be of influence in a war on Soviet soil. One of these factors is the extensive Soviet spy system. The network of Red agents extends world wide and inside the borders of Russia as well.[25] Couple this system with the security apparatus used by the Soviet regime to "insure its firm hold on the country and on the people,"[26] i.e., the Committee of State Security (KGB) and the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD); and it becomes clear that Russia is a country whose population is under much stricter centralized control than it was in World War II. Undoubtedly this will have an impact on Soviet ability to order and conduct partisan activity in the future.

Consider another area of interest. Conscription in the Soviet Union has been carried on since World War II. Approximately 800,000 men are inducted annually into the armed forces for three to four year periods. Upon release from active duty these conscriptees are eligible by law for reserve duty and refresher training.[27] Both trained reservists and others too young to be conscripted are eligible to join the Voluntary Society for Cooperation with the Army, Aviation, and Fleet (DOSAAF). In addition, millions of youths join the Young Communist League (KOMSOMOL). Although neither of these organizations are purely military, nevertheless they sponsor

[25]J. Bernard Hutton, School for Spies (London: Neville Spearman, 1961). See, for example, Part I: "Training Russia's Army Without Uniforms".

[26]DA Pamphlet 30-50-1, p. 223.

[27]Ibid., pp. 82-83. Only conscriptees are considered here since enlistees are assumed to remain in service. Any enlistee who subsequently leaves active military service would, of course, increase the quoted figure.

training for pilots, potential guerrilla fighters, and civil defense personnel.[28] The total effect of conscription, DOSAAF, and KOMSOMOL is to produce a huge pool of trained people ready for service in the armed forces or in unconventional warfare.

There exist many modifying conditions, however, whose possible (though unmeasurable) significance requires exploration. Literally thousands of Soviet soldiers have seen duty in satellite countries during the past twenty years. These soldiers have been exposed to the unrest of satellite populations under Communist rule. What effect this may have on the future capabilities of the Soviet Union is problematical. It is possible to suggest that some reaction from this exposure may have a long range effect, but it will not significantly reduce the threat imposed by the Soviet Union.

On the other hand, one may consider the effect of a favorable occupation policy by an invader in Russia. Would a benevolent and understanding occupation policy reduce or even eliminate the potential partisan threat to the rear areas of the attacker? An answer to this question is not clear, but such a policy might well have a modifying influence on Soviet citizen reactions during a nuclear war. The U. S. Department of the Army, however, takes the position that the Soviet soldier is characterized by a deep-seated patriotism toward his country (although not necessarily the Communist Party). "His hatred can be aroused easily against an invading enemy."[29] It would be merely conjecture to estimate the total effect on population reactions if an invader of Russia first used nuclear weapons to assist his assaults against Russian forces then proceeds with an enlightened occupation policy as his attack uncovers more territory. The threat to the invader's rear area must be recognized as potentially great whether or not it actually occurs.

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[28] _Ibid._, p. 227.   [29] _Ibid._, pp. 81-82.

Summary

This assessment of Soviet doctrine, capabilities, and potentials has revealed several important characteristics. With respect to the employment of regular forces, current Soviet literature and small unit tactical exercises indicate that the Red Army is cognizant of the vulnerability of the rear areas of a modern army. Leaders and soldiers are instructed in independent actions with objectives in the rear of an enemy. Airborne and airmobile forces, from small elements to company and battalion size, are moved to an opponent's rear; operating there to disrupt lines of communications, destroy nuclear delivery means, and make raids on supply installations. Ground forces are taught to split into small units and fight as guerrillas if their organization becomes ineffective due to encirclement by the enemy. Red Army training seeks to capitalize on the Soviet soldier's relative propensity for infiltration techniques. Infiltrated units will be assigned missions in the rear of the enemy, and many units receive special ski training to enhance their mobility for this type of operation.

Besides the use of regular forces, the Soviets train their people for partisan warfare. The experiences of the Red Army in the "Great Patriotic War" are considered to be a great source of learning. Similarly, the effects and the limitations of the partisan movement have given the Russians a basis for analyzing, evaluating, and improving their planned use of irregular warfare. The population of the Soviet Union receives training through military service or civilian training organizations. As a result of this training there exist an immense trained manpower pool for use as guerrillas should a part of the USSR be overrun. Soviet strategists as well as tacticians are preparing for another "front behind the front" as an essential element of the

defense of their country.

Conclusions

The results established above lead to the following conclusions:

(1) The Soviet Union plans to use partisan warfare against any invader on Russian soil.

(2) A large trained pool of manpower exists to support a partisan movement.

(3) Regular forces will fight as partisans if they become trapped behind enemy lines.

(4) Regular forces will be moved into an enemy's rear area by ground infiltration and by air to disrupt this critical area and to provide intelligence to the Soviet Army.

(5) Both partisans and regular forces operating in an enemy's rear area will be closely controlled by Sovie. authorities.

(6) The Soviets are using the experiences of World War II in shaping their tactical doctrine.

On the basis of these conclusions, there is no doubt that an army fighting the Soviet Union on Russian soil will be required to have a well-designed doctrine for control and security of its rearward life line.

CHAPTER III

U. S. ARMY REAR AREA ORGANIZATION AND DOCTRINE

Note: This chapter outlines current doctrine using the latest publi-
        cations available as of 2 March 1965. Only draft documents are
        available for the CO-STAR concept; hence, previously published
        field manuals are used where CO-STAR is not complete.

General

         The largest fighting element of the United States ground forces

is a field army. Tailored for a large landmass campaign, a type field

army will contain over 400,000 men; and this figure includes not only

the soldiers who actually do the fighting, but also those who perform

essential support tasks. The region in which a field army is deployed

in combat in a general war will vary in width from 160 to 280 kilometers

and in depth from 160 to 320 kilometers. This region is divided into

two general areas: (1) the area forward of the corps rear boundary,

and (2) the area from the corps rear boundary to the field army rear

boundary, referred to as the field army service area (FASA).[1] The pre-

ponderance of organizations located in the FASA are combat service sup-

port type units whose primary mission is to provide logistic and admini-

strative support to the field army and other designated forces.[2]

         This chapter will first discuss the organizations that normally

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         [1] U. S. Army, FM 54-4, The Support Brigade, (Fort Lee, Virginia:
December, 1963), Draft initial manuscript, p. 9. Hereafter cited as FM 54-4.

         [2] U. S. Army, FM 100-15, Field Service Regulations Larger Units,
(Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, December, 1963), pp. 37-38.

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are located in FASA and outline their primary missions. Secondly, the broad doctrine for rear area security will be evolved. Finally, the tactical doctrine for countering enemy elements that threaten FASA will be outlined. The facts developed within this framework will then be used as a basis for later analysis.

Organization of the FASA

The field army commander assigns territorial responsibility for the forward part of the army area to the corps. Territorial responsibility for the FASA is normally assigned to the commander of the field army support command (FASCOM).[3] The FASCOM is a major subordinate command of the field army at the same level as the corps. The FASCOM commander is the logistic operator for the field army and is charged with providing combat service support to the field army and other specified forces. The FASCOM is a tailored organization much like the corps.[4] Basically, FASCOM consists of a headquarters, certain selected army-wide services, a variable number of support brigades, and miscellaneous units and teams (Chart 2). The army-wide services, such as the military police brigade, the transportation brigade, the ammunition brigade, and the civil affairs group perform their tasks throughout the entire field army area.[5]

The support brigades are of two types: an army support brigade and corps support brigades. The latter are assigned to FASCOM on the basis of

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[3] CO-STAR II, (2d Revision), (Fort Lee, Virginia: Hq., U. S. Army Combat Developments Command, Combat Service Support Group, 1963), p. 7. Hereafter cited as CO-STAR II (2d rev.).

[4] Ibid.

[5] Ibid., p. c-3. Note that there are replacement, signal, engineer, and chemical army-wide service organizations that are located in FASA but not assigned to FASCOM.

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                    │   FASCOM    │
                    │ Headquarters│
                    └──────┬──────┘
                           │
      ┌──────────────┬─────┴────────┬──────────────┐
┌───────────┐  ┌──────────┐  ┌─────────────┐  ┌──────────┐
│  FASCOM   │  │  Band    │  │   FASCOM    │  │  Fin Tm  │
│ Commander │  │          │  │ Invt Con Cen│  │(Funding) │
└─────┬─────┘  └──────────┘  └─────────────┘  └──────────┘
      │
┌───────────┐
│ Sig Med HQ│
│   Op Co   │
└───────────┘
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      ┌───────────────┬──────────────┬──────────────┐
┌───────────┐  ┌──────────┐  ┌──────────────┐  ┌───────────────┐
│ Ammunition│  │ Medical  │  │Transportation│  │Military Police│
│  Brigade  │  │ Brigade  │  │   Brigade    │  │   Brigade     │
└───────────┘  └──────────┘  └──────────────┘  └───────────────┘
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      ┌───────────────┬──────────────┬──────────────┐
┌───────────┐  ┌──────────┐  ┌──────────────┐  ┌───────────────┐
│Army Support│ │Corps Support│ │Civil Affairs│ │ Replacement   │
│  Brigade   │ │  Brigade    │ │   Group     │ │  Battalion    │
└───────────┘  └──────────┘  └──────────────┘  └───────────────┘
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      ┌─────────────────────────┐
┌───────────────┐        ┌───────────────┐
│Data Processing│        │PIO and Field  │
│     Unit      │        │Press Cens Tm  │
└───────────────┘        └───────────────┘
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
Chart 2.—Field Army Support Command Organization.

one per supported corps, are habitually lodged in the corps rear area, and are consequently of little interest to this study. The army support brigade, however, is a major functional unit of FASCOM and of significant interest to this paper. The army support brigade is assigned on the basis of one per FASA, and it is tailored to provide logistic support to the FASCOM. The basic operating units of the army support brigade are general support groups and direct support groups.[6]

Normally, two general support groups are assigned to the army support brigade. A general support group consists of a non-branch headquarters and functionally organized elements of chemical, engineer, ordnance, quartermaster, signal, and transportation services. The general support groups assigned to the army support brigade provide general support backup for the direct support groups in the FASA.[7]

The army support brigade usually has two direct support groups assigned to it in addition to the two general support groups. A direct support group consists of a non-branch headquarters, maintenance elements, supply and service elements, and a transportation truck element. The direct support groups assigned to the army support brigade perform tasks similar to a non-divisional support command for designated units in the FASCOM[8] (Chart 3).[9]

As stated earlier a major subordinate command of the field army is the FASCOM. The missions assigned to the FASCOM are as follows:

(1) to command and control the combat service support units of the field army;

(2) to assume territorial responsibility for the FASA;

(3) to provide combat service support to the field army;

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[6]FM 54-4, p. 10.   [7]Ibid.   [8]Ibid., p. 11   [9]Ibid., figure 9.

Chart 3.—Army Support Brigade Organization.

(4) to be responsible for area damage control and rear area security throughout the FASA.[10]

The FASCOM commander is provided with a headquarters and a complete staff to aid him in the command and control mission (Chart 4).[11] To accomplish his territorial responsibility for the FASA, the FASCOM commander further assigns this mission to the army support brigade.[12] The third mission, that of providing combat service support to the field army, is a tremendous responsibility. The FASCOM commander accomplishes this mission by employing his army-wide services throughout the field army, by assigning responsibility for logistic support of the corps to his corps support brigades, and by using his army support brigade to provide logistic support to the units in the FASA. Finally, the area damage control and the rear area security tasks are assigned by the FASCOM commander to the army support brigade.[13] Thus, by allocating tasks to subordinate elements, the FASCOM accomplishes its missions. It should be noted that the army support brigade plays an important part in the FASCOM scheme of operations; consequently, the army support brigade is provided with a headquarters and an appropriate staff organization designed to aid the commander in meeting his responsibilities (Chart 5).[14]

In order to understand better the size and scope of the tasks performed by FASCOM units, the following approximate data are presented:[15]

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[10] CO-STAR II (2d rev.), p. 7.

[11] U. S. Department of the Army, Table of Organization and Equipment 54-12F (Rev.) Headquarters and Special Troops, Field Army Support Command, undated, p. 2. Hereafter cited as TOE 54-12F.

[12] FM 54-4, p. 92.   [13] Ibid., p. 91.

[14] U. S. Department of the Army, Table of Organization and Equipment 54-22F (Rev.), Headquarters and Headquarters Company, Support Brigade, p. 2. Hereafter cited as TOE 54-22F.

[15] CO-STAR II (2d rev.), p. III

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                    ┌─────────────┐
                    │  HQ and Sp  │
                    │     Trp     │
                    │   FASCOM    │
                    └──────┬──────┘
                           │
                    ┌──────┴──────┐
                    │   Comd Sec  │
                    └──────┬──────┘
                           │
        ┌───────────┬──────┴──────┬───────────┐
   ┌────┴────┐  ┌───┴─────┐   ┌───┴────┐
   │   SGS   │──│ CofS Sec│───│Info Sec│
   └─────────┘  └───┬─────┘   └────────┘
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ACofS Pers	ACofS Scty, Plans, and Op	ACofS Svc	ACofS Sup	ACofS Maint	ACofS CA

AG Sec	Ch Sec	Fin Sec	Sp Trp FASCOM	IG Sec	JA Sec

HQ Comdt	HQ Co

Chart 4.—Headquarters and Special Troops, Field Army Support Command.

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                    ┌─────────────┐
                    │    HHC      │
                    │  Spt Bde    │
                    └──────┬──────┘
                    ┌──────┴──────┐
                    │  Comd Sec   │
                    └──────┬──────┘
                    ┌──────┴──────┐
                    │  CofS Sec   │
                    └──────┬──────┘
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| ACofS Pers | ACofS Scty, Plans, and Op | ACofS Svc | ACofS Sup | ACofS Maint | ACofS CA |

| AG Sec | Ch Sec | IG Sec | HQ Comdt | Fin Sec | JA Sec |

| HQ Co |

Chart 5.—Headquarters and Headquarters Company, Army Support Brigade.

Organization	Troops Assigned
Field Army	400,000
FASCOM	97,000
Corps Support brigades	40,000
Army Support brigade	16,250
Army-wide Services and headquarters	40,750

Since the corps support brigades and approximately one third of the army-wide services will be operating forward in the corps areas, there will normally be approximately 44,000 troops assigned to FASCOM and lodged in the FASA. In addition, various support units from the communications zone, Air Force personnel, army air defense units, army engineers, and tactical forces from the field army reserve will normally be tenants in the FASA. It is estimated that the troop strength in the FASA will vary from 70,000 to 80,000 depending on the situation.[16] The size of the FASA together with the troop strength located there are clear indications of the magnitude of the mission of territorial responsibility for the FASA. Equally significant is the burden of rear area security, an allied task to that of territorial responsibility.

Rear Area Security

Rear area security measures are actions taken to prevent or neutralize enemy threats to units, activities, and installations in the rear area, except active air defense operations or actions against enemy threats large enough to endanger the command. A large-scale enemy penetration or vertical envelopment of the rear is considered a part of the main battle, requiring use of reserves or combat units from forward areas.

. . . .

Within rear areas, all commanders are responsible for local security . . . at their respective units and installations. . . . Army commanders who have area responsibility insure that coordinated plans provide for mutual assistance between Army units and other services. Designated commanders are responsible for rear area security and area damage control; these commanders integrate local

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[16]These figures are intended only as guides to illustrate an average troop density in the FASA. Wide variance can be expected depending upon the field army mission. Especially significant is the engineer strength in the FASA.

security and damage control plans into overall area plans.[17]

Commencing with the above as a definitive statement of rear area security policy and responsibility, Army doctrinal guidance outlines several other important features. It is stated that "rear area security activities involve the seeking out and destroying [sic] hostile forces before they can attack units and installations." Further, it is often necessary to conduct rear area security operations in areas remote from installations.[18] Service units, specifically designated combat units, units in reserve, and replacements may be used to perform rear area security missions; but use of the latter should be to augment RAS forces, and should not be of such duration that it would disrupt the replacement system.[19] On the other hand, "rear area security . . . is essentially defensive in nature," is the point of view of the CO-STAR II special text. "The primary mission of the combat service support units [with respect to RAS] is to protect themselves."[20]

Rear area security operations are conducted in two phases. Phase I consists of those operations and plans that take place prior to a hostile attack. Phase II encompasses those actions that take place during and after a hostile attack.[21] Recognizing that hostile action against rear areas

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[17] U. S. Army, *Field Service Regulations Administration*, FM 100-10, (Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, July, 1963), p. 40. Hereafter cited as FM 100-10. Also see U. S. Army, *Field Service Regulations Operations*, FM 100-5, (Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, February, 1962), p. 173. Hereafter cited as FM 100-5.

[18] FM 100-10, p. 40. Also see, U. S. Army, *Doctrinal Guidance*, FM 100-1, (Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, September, 1959), p. 16-7B1. Hereafter cited as FM 100-1.

[19] FM 100-10, pp. 40-41.

[20] U. S. Army Combat Service Support Group, *Combat Service Support to the Army*, Special Text, (Fort Lee, Virginia: March, 1963), pp. 14-1 to 14-3. Hereafter cited as Special Text CO-STAR II (rev.).

[21] FM 100-10, p. 45.

may be accomplished by long-range nuclear attack, there exists a requirement for dispersion of installations to reduce vulnerability. However, in order to reduce vulnerability to enemy ground assault it is better to cluster units for mutual support and protection. Thus, a part of phase I operations is reaching a compromise on these two conflicting requirements. In addition, phase I activities include establishing local security; designating combat units as rear area security forces; training the forces; testing warning systems and standing operating procedures (SOP); and performing essential reconnaissance to familiarize personnel with the area of operations. Phase II operations consist of locating, attacking, and destroying hostile forces; or, if this is beyond the capability of the rear area security forces, containing the enemy forces until additional friendly troops arrive.[22] Thus, rear area security is a defined type of operation, both passive and active in nature, defensive and offensive in character, and conducted in two phases by all units lodged in a rear area.

Within the framework outlined thus far, certain other characteristics of rear area security are germane to this investigation. A 1951 Department of the Army study had this to say:

> To be successful, rear area defense must be based on a broad realistic plan that coordinates the political, administrative, and military phases of the operation.[23]
> . . . .
> Continuity of command and forces employed within rear defense areas . . . is essen-

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[22]Ibid., pp. 45-46. Also see, "Rear Area Security and Area Damage Control in the Communications Zone," U. S. Army Command and General Staff College Study, (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: November, 1960), p. 9. Hereafter cited as RAS and ADC in COMMZ.

[23]Lt. Col. Volckmann, "Rear Area Defense" (Revised, Office, Chief of Psychological Warfare, Special Operations Division, Department of the Army, 1951), p. 1.

tial. The rotation or relief of commanders
and troops works to the advantage of subver-
sive and guerrilla forces.[24]

This same study concluded that a need exists for development
of doctrine, policies, and techniques governing the defense of rear
areas against hostile subversion, sabotage, guerrilla warfare, infiltra-
tion, and airborne operations.[25] A 1960 study, approved as doctrine by
Department of the Army, found that "the threat of guerrilla activities
in many instances may exceed the threat of missile attacks in rear
areas."[26] This same study concluded: (1) there is a requirement for
one overa . commander for rear area security, area damage control, and
combat service support; and (2) when the situation requires, specific
combat forces should be assigned to rear area security missions.[27]
Finally, by September 1964 a briefing on future army developments had
this to say:

> The problems of Rear Area Security . . . result from
> several sources. First and foremost [italics mine]
> is the generally accepted viewpoint that forces can-
> not be made available for these functions on a stand-
> by basis, or at least not until a definite threat is
> known. Second is the assumption that the ability of
> support units to protect themselves is of second pri-
> ority to the basic mission of support to the combat
> zone.
> . . . .
> The Rear Area Security problem can be completely
> sol\ i only by assignment of sufficient tactical forces
> to dispose of threats.[29]

Underlying the above statements is the fundamental idea of current U.

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[24]Ibid., p. 3.   [25]Ibid., p. 2.   [26]RAS and ADC in COMMZ, p. 21.

[27]Ibid., p. 10.

[28]"TASTA-70, Briefing," (Fort Lee, Virginia: Combat Service
Support Group, U. S. Army Combat Developments Command, September, 1964),
p. 15c.

[29]Ibid., p. 16c.

S. Army rear area security doctrine that advocates economy of combat forces in rear area missions. Consequently, it is urged that maximum use be made of indigenous personnel to reduce the requirement for combat troops in a rear area security role.[30] This, of course, serves to aid the army in two ways: (1) it reduces the overall requirement for regular security forces; and (2) it reduces the number of potential partisans by gainfully employing the local population. One danger, however, is that the indigenous force can easily be working for two masters.

In recognition of the fact that multilateral agreements have generated a great need for international military cooperation, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) forces are signatories to certain standardization agreements (STANAG). One of these, STANAG 2079, prescribes mutually acceptable rear area security principles. Specifically, the following are part of this standardization agreement:

(1) Rear area security and area damage control should be combined in a single operation.
(2) An effective system for rear area security, area damage control, and combat service support must possess:
    (a) Definite fixing of geographic responsibility
    (b) A single commander for all three functions in the same geographic area.
    (c) A control organization which prevents conflict and competition between agencies responsible for rear area security, area damage control, and combat service support and includes an operations centre for all three functions with necessary communications.
    (d) Provision for prompt integration of lodger units into plans.[31]

Further, it is agreed that all units are responsible for their own

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[30] RAS and ADC in COMMZ, p. 5.

[31] U. S. Department of the Army, STANAG No. 2079-Rear Area Security and Rear Area Damage Control, (Washington: Office of the Adjutant General, June, 1961).

local security; however, service troops will normally not be assigned any security task other than that of their own installation.[32]

To this point in the discussion of the FASA, the organization of the FASA has been illustrated; and the broad doctrinal guidance for rear area security has been evolved. Consider now the tactical requirements and doctrine for the conduct of rear area security.

Tactics and Techniques

At FASCOM level, staff responsibility for rear area security is assigned to the assistant chief of staff for security, plans, and operations (ACofS Scty, Plans, and Op) (Chart 6).[33] This staff officer is also responsible for operating the area damage control center (ADCOC). The ADCOC is specifically charged with recording and disseminating area damage control information. There is, however, some evidence to indicate that the ADCOC will be used also as a "clearing house" for rear area security information as well as area damage control.[34]

Although the FASCOM commander is charged with responsibility for rear area security in the FASA, he further assigns this responsibility to the army support brigade commander. The latter is charged, therefore, with territorial responsibility throughout the FASA. Like FASCOM, the army support brigade is provided with an ADCOC that operates under ACofS Scty, Plans, and Op (Chart 7).[35] All reports of hostile actions through-

[32] Ibid.

[33] CO-STAR II (2d Rev), p. 3-5 and TOE 55-12F (Rev), p. 54.

[34] Special Text, CO-STAR II (rev), pp. 14-5 to 14-6. However, see CO-STAR II (2d rev), p. C-8. These texts refer to this installation as the area damage display center, but the later TOE 54-12F (Rev) changes the name to area damage control center (ADCOC).

[35] FM 54-4, p. 206. But see also TOE 54-22F (Rev): the discussion of ADCOC here does not indicate a RAS function; pp. 52-53.

ACofS, Scty, Plans, and Op		
ACofS, Scty, Plans, and Op	BG	1
Chief Op Sgt	E-9	1
Secy	E-5	1
		3

Plans and Op Br		
Plans and Op Off	Col	1
Asst Plans and Op Off	Lt Col	1
	Maj	1
Org and Tng Off	Maj	1
Chief Log Op Sgt	E-8	1
Op Sgt	E-8	1
Asst Op Sgt	E-7	1
Log Op Sgt	E-7	1
Clerk Typist	E-4	1
Gen Draftsman	E-4	1
Rept Clerk	E-4	1
		11

Intel Br		
Intel Off	Col	1
Tech Intel Off	Lt Col	1
Chief Intel Sgt	E-8	1
Tech Intel Sgt	E-7	1
Intel Analyst	E-5	2
Clerk Typist	E-4	1
Rept Clerk	E-4	1
		8

Scty and Dam Con Br		
Scty and Area Dam Con Off	Col	1
Chief Scty Sgt	E-9	1
		2

Security Office		
RASC	Lt Col	1
	Maj	1
Chief Scty Op Sgt	E-8	1
Clerk Typist	E-4	1
Gen Draftsman	E-4	1
Rept Clerk	E-4	1
		6

| ADCOC		
ADCOC Director	Lt Col	1
Nuc Eff Engr	Maj	1
ADCOC Tm Chief	Capt	2
ADCOC Op Sgt	E-8	1
Nuc Eff Sgt	E-8	2
Plotter	E-7	4
Computer	E-6	2
Op Specialist	E-5	2
Clerk Typist	E-4	1
		16

Chart 6.—Typical organization of the security, plans, and operations staff section within FASCOM HQ.

ACofS, Scty, Plans,and Op		
ACofS, Scty, Plans,and Op	Col	1
Secy	E-5	1
		2

Plans and Op Br		
Plans and Op Off	Lt Col	1
Chief Log Op Sgt	E-9	1
Gen Draftsman	E-4	1
		3

Intel, Scty, and Dam Con Br		
Intel and Scty Off	Lt Col	1
ADCOC Director	Maj	1
Nuc Eff Engr	Maj	1
ADCOC Tm Chief	Capt	2
Intel and Scty Sgt	E-9	1
ADCOC Op Sgt	E-8	1
Nuc Eff Sgt	E-8	2
Plotter	E-7	4
Computer	E-6	2
Clerk Typist	E-4	1
		16

Chart 7.—Typical organization of the security, plans, and operations staff section within army support brigade headquarters.

out FASA are received and recorded in the ADCOC and disseminated to units and staffs. In addition, two area damage control teams, consisting of technically trained supervisory personnel of relatively high rank, are assigned to the army support brigade. The teams can move into a critical area where local command has been lost because of hostile action and assume complete command and control of "any field army units required to combat or alleviate the situation." Further, these teams have the authority to employ any forces in the area necessary to accomplish their immediate damage control mission.[36]

Depending upon the enemy threat and the density of support units in the area, FASA may be broken down into subareas with a subarea controller for rear area security in each subarea. This subarea controller is responsible for command and control of his own assigned units, and for planning and coordinating the rear area security plans of tenant units.[37] The responsibility here can sometimes transcend regularly assigned missions. For example, the commander with territorial responsibility may direct adjacent units to release provisional area damage control teams to his control.[38] Under all conditions, plans for rear area security must provide for at least the following:

(1) coordinated local security of units and installations;

(2) relief of attacked installations and units;

(3) route and cross-country patrolling, and convoy escort;

(4) denial of drop and landing zones, and surveillance of suspected bases of operations for partisans;

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[36]Special Text, CO-STAR II (rev), pp. 14-6 to 14-7.

[37]ST 100-10-1, p. 36, and TOE 55-22F (Rev), p. 50.

[38]ST 100-10-1, p. 39, and Special Text, CO-STAR II (rev), p. 14-6.

(5) locating and destroying hostile forces in the rear areas.[39]

Two broad categories of rear area security activities have been shown to exist. The first of these includes only that security provided by the units lodged in an area. The second encompasses conditions when the tenant units are not capable of providing adequate security, and specific combat troops must be designated to perform the task of rear area security. Applicable to the latter case are the following characteristics for a rear area security force:

(1) A high degree of mobility (ground, air, or both).

(2) Highly effective, mobile communications.

(3) Capability of achieving combat power superiority over expected hostile forces.

(4) Capability of accomplishing a variety of security missions including reconnaissance, convoy escort, and attack of hostile elements.

(5) Ability to react rapidly with appropriate means to develop the situation.

(6) Adaptability to tailoring for specific missions.

(7) Ability to exercise surveillance over large areas and to mass rapidly when and where required.

(8) Ability to minimize the effects of nuclear, chemical, or biological attacks.[40]

Of equal importance is the necessity for assigning rear area security forces for sufficient time to permit them to become familiar with the

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[39] ST 100-10-1, p. 39.   [40] Ibid.

area of operations and the tactics of the enemy. The development of
adequate teamwork within the force is also a matter requiring some
time.[41]

After a force has been assigned a rear area security responsi-
bility, one of its most difficult tasks is counterguerrilla operations.
U. S. Army doctrine for counterguerrilla operations points out:

> Preventing the formation of a resistance
> movement is much easier than dealing
> with one after it is formed. Likewise,
> destroying such a movement is much eas-
> ier during its early stages than when it
> has reached more advanced stages of de-
> velopment.[42]

In any event, "counterguerrilla operations must include appropriate
action against the civilian and underground support of the guerrilla
force."[43] Guerrilla vulnerabilities are:

(1) the need for support of the civilian population;

(2) a source of food and medical supply;

(3) its command structure;

(4) maintenance of morale; and

(5) arms and ammunition supply.[44]

Successful counterguerrilla operations will capitalize on these guer-

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[41] Ibid., See also: Subject M5623, _Logistical Command Planning for a Newly Established Theater of Operations_, (U. S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1964), p. 14-IV-2.

[42] U. S. Army, FM 31-16, _Counterguerrilla Operations_, (Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, February, 1963), p. 20.

[43] _Ibid._

[44] _Ibid._, p. 21. But see field manuals in the 7 and 17 series for infantry and armor. These manuals list: (1) secure base of op-erations, (2) source of supply, (3) intelligence system, and (4) ade-quate communications as the four major guerrilla requirements.

rilla vulnerabilities. Through the use of detailed plans, good intelligence, superior relative mobility, aggressive and imaginative leadership, and continuous pressure on the guerrilla forces, a counterguerrilla force will succeed in its mission. The guerrilla is given no time to rest and reorganize; he is hounded continuously. By separating the guerrilla force from the civilian population and its source of resupply, the counterguerrilla force keeps the enemy off balance and retains the initiative for itself.[45]

The tactical maneuvers used to accomplish the tasks outlined above are common to all combat units: infantry, armor, and mechanized infantry. The sequence of actions is encirclement, attack, and pursuit.[46] Each element of this sequence requires a high degree of training, mobility, and aggressiveness by the executing units; and teamwork is essential for success. Concurrent with the tactical maneuvers, psychological operations are conducted to separate the guerrilla from his civilian support and reduce his will to fight.[47]

It is likely that a rear area security force may be assigned the mission of police operations. This type of action has two primary purposes: (1) population control; and (2) security of military troops and installations, key communities, and lines of communication.[48] Police operations requir a high standard of conduct and efficiency by the participating force. Further, the force commander should be given opera-

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[45]Ibid., pp. 21-22.

[46]U. S. Army, FM 7-20, Infantry, Airborne Infantry, and Mechanized Infantry Battalions, (Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, January, 1962), pp. 236-237. Hereafter cited as FM 7-20. See also Field Manuals 7-30, 17-1, 17-30, and 17-36.

[47]U. S. Army, FM 7-30, Infantry, Airborne, and Mechanized Infantry Brigades, (Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, January, 1962), p. 201.

[48]FM 31-16, p. 37.

tional control of the local police and paramilitary units who are friendly and are operating within the assigned force area.[49] Civil affairs activities also play an important part in police operations.[50]

Army Air Defense

Earlier it was mentioned that the definition of rear area security excluded active air defense, but there is a definite requirement for air defense in the FASA. In general, ground air defense for the entire field army area is provided by the integration of two air defense missile systems: the low-altitude Hawk and the high-altitude Nike Hercules.[51] Centralized coordination of the integrated air defense system is essential; consequently, all air defense operations in the field army area are coordinated by the field army air defense artillery (ADA) commander.[52] This field army ADA commander is required to coordinate "with FASCOM to provide compatibility of standing operating procedure with rear area security . . . plans." It should be noted in this connection, however, that the problem of aircraft identification is a serious deficiency in the army air defense capability.[53] With particular reference to Hawk units, these missile defense elements may be used for either an area or installation defense. Basic employment concepts are four in number: (1) cover likely low-altitude routes of approach, (2) achieve early des-

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[49]Ibid., p. 38 and p. 105.   [50]Ibid., p. 110.

[51]Subject A2445, Air Defense in Theaters (Areas) of Operations, (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: U. S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1964), p. L2-III-2.

[52]U. S. Army, FM 44-1, Air Defense Employment, (Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, February, 1964), pp. 41-43.

[53]Ibid., p. 42 and p. 49.

truction of airborne objects, (3) obtain defense in depth, and (4) give sufficient attention to position requirements.[54] The Nike Hercules missile units are designed for high-altitude engagement and for longer ranges. Hence, while they are important to the overall air defense scheme, there is no special consideration for Nike Hercules units in rear area security except for local installation defense.

Attack Doctrine

A significant potential rear area threat has been generated by one aspect of tactical doctrine: the fact that an attacking unit is not required to mop up bypassed enemy units in its zone unless specifically ordered to do so.[55] The reasons for this concept are tactically sound, but the possible effect on security in the rear areas must be considered.

Civil Affairs

The doctrine of civil affairs (CA) activities merits further attention with respect to its support of rear area security activities. Civil affairs involves the relationship between a military force and the civilians in a friendly or occupied area. CA operations are designed directly to support the political-military mission of a commander with respect to any project that involves contact between the military and the civilian population.[56] The basic guidline for CA activities in support of the

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[54]U. S. Army, FM 44-96, Air Defense Artillery Missile Unit, Hawk, (Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, December, 1963), pp. 56-57.

[55]U. S. Army, FM 61-100, The Division, (Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, January, 1962), p. 88.

[56]U. S. Army, FM 41-10, Civil Affairs Operations, (Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, May, 1962), p. 3. Hereafter cited as FM 41-10.

military commander is to "prevent civilian interference with military operations." This mission inherently requires maintenance of public order and implies the more positive tasks of the control of epidemics and disease, and of the use of local resources for tactical and logistical purposes.[57] The nature of CA activities requires that the senior commander controls them, but he may delegate this authority to subordinate commanders as necessary.[58]

> Since combat forces normally are not used
> in rear area security roles unless absolutely
> required, it is essential that initial CA
> operations be directed primarily toward gaining
> early control of the population in land areas
> occupied . . . by the military force.
>
> . . . .
> Since guerrillas thrive on confusion and the
> disorganization of government, CA operations
> are so conducted as to engender stable con-
> ditions which are unfavorable to guerrilla
> activities . . .
>
> . . . .
> The threat of hostile guerrilla operations
> necessitates extensive security measures to
> safeguard troops, military installations, lines
> of communications, local institutions, and the
> resources of the area from guerrilla attack,
> and to protect the local population from guer-
> rilla coercion and exploitation.[59]

Civil affairs operations recognize the many sided aspect of the guerrilla-civilian support concept, and CA teams are charged with aiding the rear area security commander to counter the threat. Specifically, "intelligently conceived and wisely executed" policies as well as "effectively coordinated" and "vigorously implemented" plans are essential in preventing the development of a resistance or guerrilla movement in an occupied area.[60] Finally, CA doctrine proposes that plans for civil affairs include provisions for area damage control, security of installations and

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[57]Ibid., pp. 5-6.   [58]Ibid.   [59]Ibid., p. 145.

[60]Ibid., p. 146.

lines of communications, and psychological warfare.[61]

Psychological Warfare

Basic doctrinal guidance requires that counterguerrilla "measures include the use of psychological warfare operations in conjunction with civil affairs and the use of combat troops . . . ."[62] The type of psychological operation used in conjunction with counterguerrilla activities is called consolidation psychological operations.[63] Psychological warfare units are normally attached to civil affairs elements for operations in occupied territory. These units will support CA elements in their efforts to avoid civilian interference with military operations. Resentment against occupation forces, military misconduct, and ideological differences are three significant factors that may operate counter to the objectives of consolidation psychological operations.[64] Similar to the tactical operations of combat troops, psychological operations are designed to capitalize on the weaknesses and vulnerabilities of the guerrilla force.

Chemical and Biological Warfare

To complete the picture of current U. S. Army tactical doctrine, some attention to chemical warfare (CW) and biological warfare (BW) doctrine is required. The use of chemical and biological agents within one's

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[61]U. S. Army, FM 41-5, Joint Manual of Civil Affairs/Military Government, (Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, November, 1958), p. 85.

[62]FM 100-5, p. 130.

[63]U. S. Army, FM 33-5, Psychological Operations, (Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, January, 1962), p. 132.

[64]Ibid., pp. 133-138.

own rear area is a distinct possibility if an enemy threat becomes se-
vere enough to warrant drastic measures.[65] Chemical warfare employs
chemical agents that are lethal or non-lethal, persistent or non-persis-
tent. In addition, chemical agents can be delivered by a variety of
means: cannon, rocket, guided missile, aircraft, and land mines.[66]
Biological agents are also lethal or non-lethal, and some agents are more
persistent than others. Further, there are a variety of means and methods
for disseminating biological agents.[67] Assuming that CW and BW have been
authorized, there are several factors affecting their employment in rear
areas. Of prime importance is the fact that thousands of friendly troops
are scattered throughout the area thus limiting the scope of employment.
Weather data, vegetation, and terrain configuration must also be con-
sidered. Knowing that guerrilla forces normally will not have sufficient
protective means, a rear area commander must consider the rather consider-
able advantages of using CB agents to destroy the guerrillas and to deny
them the use of redoubt or "safe" areas.[68] Current chemical and biologi-
cal doctrine very definitely provides for a counterguerrilla use of chemi-
cal and biological agents.

Summary

The FASA is a part of the combat zone and contains 70,000 to
80,000 troops, mostly combat support and combat service support personnel.

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[65]U. S. Army, FM 3-10, Chemical and Biological Weapons Employment,
(Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, February, 1962), p. 12
and p. 55.

[66]Ibid., pp. 12-15.   [67]Ibid., pp. 51-55.

[68]U. S. Army, FM 3-5, Chemical, Biological and Radiological (CBR)
Operations, (Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, September,
1961), p. 88 and p. 102.

The field army commander assigns territorial responsibility for the FASA to the FASCOM commander who in turn holds the army support brigade commander responsible for rear area security and area damage control throughout the FASA. Under CO-STAR, the FASCOM is a functionalized support organization containing the necessary combat service support elements to provide support to the assigned and attached field army forces.

Rear area security involves both local installation security and active security operations against enemy attacks that are not of sufficient scope to endanger the entire command. Basic doctrine envisions that rear area security, area damage control, and combat service support within a given area should be under a single commander. Active air defense, however, is not a part of rear area security; and combat troops should not be assigned rear area security missions until and unless the threat requires it. Combat service support units and all units located in designated rear area commands are required to prepare coordinated local defense plans under the supervision of the local area commander. Within FASA it may be necessary to divide the area into subareas. Under these conditions, subordinate unit commanders of FASCOM and the army support brigade are designated subarea commanders.

When combat units are assigned rear area security missions, they may be attached to an area or subarea command. Such combat units will plan and execute operations against the enemy threat using applicable doctrine. Against guerrillas, a counterguerrilla force will surround, attack, and pursue the enemy. This force will operate against known guerrilla weaknesses, and its actions should be coordinated with civil affairs, psychological operations, air defense, and chemical and biological warfare. Certain combat units may perform police operations to control the civilian population and to protect rear area installations. Maximum use will be

made of indigenous civil police and paramilitary forces who are sympathetic to the operating force. The key to success is immediate reaction, rapid deployment, and sufficient strength to counter the threat.

CHAPTER IV

TESTING THE DOCTRINE

The Soviet threat to an invader's rear area and United States Army doctrine for safeguarding the field army service area have been investigated. This chapter challenges U. S. rear area security doctrine in light of the known threat. The examination is presented in four parts: (1) definition of the test model to include the setting and general situation; (2) a first phase condition that portrays sporadic partisan actions; (3) a second phase development that describes a growing partisan movement; and (4) a third phase situation that involves a large scale partisan uprising. In each of the phases, the responses of U. S. rear area commanders in the field army service area are presented to show the expected reaction, under current doctrine, to the specific threat or potential threat. The analysis of each of the three phases will be undertaken in the next chapter.

THE MODEL

Early in a general war[1] between the United States and the Soviet Union, a type U. S. field army is deployed in western Russia. The field army is composed of three corps of four divisions each, four mechanized

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[1] U. S. Army, AR 320-5, Dictionary of United States Army Terms, (Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, February, 1963), p. 178. General war is defined as: "Armed conflict between the major powers of the Communist and free worlds in which the total resources of the belligerents are employed, and the national survival of a major belligerent is in jeopardy."

brigades of four battalions each, and four armored cavalry regiments.
In addition to the normal artillery, engineer and other combat support
units, the field army contains a combat service support organization
consisting of a field army support command organized as shown in Chart
2. The entire field army has been tailored for a sustained campaign on
a large landmass. No combat units have been assigned to the field army
specifically for rear area security missions. Theater reserves are
limited due to required mobilization and training of units in the United
States. Consequently, unit replacements are available only on a pri-
ority basis from theater army. Individual replacements are processed
directly to divisions from theater army with only army troops replace-
ments coming through the field army support command (FASCOM).

The field army service area (FASA) is located entirely in Bello-
russia. It is 250 kilometers wide and 200 kilometers deep, and the ter-
rain in the FASA is characterized by dense forests and swamps that cover
approximately 60% of the area.[2] The road net is adequate to support
field army operations, but the rail lines are few. Alternate road and
rail nets are generally not available. Many villages but only a few
cities are scattered generally along the axes of transportation facili-
ties (Fig. 1).

The fie I army commander has assigned territorial responsibility
for the FASA to the FASCOM commander. Located in the FASA are the organic
elements of FASCOM, except the corps support brigades and some parts of
the army wide services. Several support elements from the Communications
zone, army air defense units, army engineers and two hundred replacements

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[2] U. S. Army, Combat in Russian Forests and Swamps, DA Pamphlet
20-231, (Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, July, 1951),
pp. 1-3.

FIELD ARMY SERVICE AREA

200 Km

250 Km

XXXX XXX XX

Figure 1

awaiting assignment to army units are also scattered throughout the FASA; but these organizations are not attached to FASCOM.

Prior to their deployment, field army, field army support command, and other subordinate units published standing operating procedures (SOP) to govern the routine aspects of field operations. The field army's SOP contained an annex devoted to rear area security. Three salient features of the army's rear area security SOP are:

(1) the commanding general, field army support command will organize, plan, and direct rear area security in the field army service area,

(2) each unit and installation commander in the field army service area will comply with the directives and instructions pertaining to rear area security as promulgated by the FASCOM commander,

(3) each unit and installation commander in the field army service area will provide his own local security and report command post location upon entering, leaving, or changing position in the FASA.[3]

Finally, both the United States and the Soviet Union are employing nuclear weapons. Recent employment of chemical and biological agents by the Russians has forced the United States to announce publicly its intention to retaliate in kind.

FIRST PHASE—THE LATENT MENACE

Situation

The field army service area has been relatively free of hostile

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[3]The complete rear area security annex to the field army SOP contains more details, but the listed elements are most important to this study. See Appendix II, page 121 for a typical army SOP rear area security annex extracted from the Field SOP of the U. S. Seventh Army in Europe.

attack. One five kiloton nuclear explosion destroyed a supply dump three days ago, but the losses sustained were not critical to the field army. During the past two weeks there has been no ground attack of installations in the FASA. One convoy of three vehicles was ambushed by a reported ten man guerrilla band four nights ago, and three Soviet parachutes were discovered in a cleared area two days ago.

The FASCOM commander has delegated territorial responsibility for the FASA to the army support brigade commander. Civil affairs teams are operating in populated parts of the FASA under the centralized control of the CA group commander who in turn is commanded by the FASCOM commander. Psychological warfare operations are controlled at field army level and are directed at the Soviet front line forces. Two of the three U. S. corps do not require their attacking divisions to clear the zone.

Threat

There are two distinct elements of the rear area threat: one is the recent minor guerrilla action; the other is the potential partisan buildup for which history has shown a precedence and for which current Soviet doctrine predicts a repetition. The former is a relatively minor danger, but the latter could escalate rapidly into a major menace. Before proceeding with an outline of the rear area commander's reaction to this menace, review the evidence from chapters one and two that established the nature of the potential threat.

The analysis of the World War II Russian Partisan Movement concluded that partisan bands were formed as a consequence of:

        (1) suitable terrain,

        (2) bypassed regular army units,

(3) Soviet attempts to organize irregular groups,

(4) poor German occupation policy.

The evidence of chapter II reinforces the factors above with current Soviet plans and doctrine. For example: suitable terrain for guerrilla bands consists of forests, swamps, and areas of relatively difficult access. This type terrain was and is prevalent in Bellorussia, hence one factor of the potential threat is present.

When the Germans failed to clear bypassed pockets of Red Army units, many of the soldiers slipped free and joined or formed partisan bands. Soviet current doctrine provides for training units that become surrounded to break up into small elements and escape to fight as guerrillas.[4] The second parameter above is therefore established.

At a time during World War II when the Red Army was retreating from the German offensive, the Soviets were willing to divert combat forces to the task of infiltrating by air into the German rear area with the mission of organizing partisan b nds. Modern Soviet airborne units are trained for rear area missions of destruction and of organizing guerrillas.

The fourth factor, a poor German occupation policy, was probably the most significant contributor to the partisan uprising. Harsh treatment of the indigenous people, overly severe punishment by the Germans for even the smallest violation, and the lack of a consistent policy forced the Russian civilians from their houses into the woods and eventually into partisan organizations. The Soviet citizen today is, on the average, a product of some type of military or paramilitary training, has been under strict Communist Party control since childhood, and has a love for his homeland of Russia. The evidence in chapter II shows that the Soviets

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[4] DA Pamphlet 30-40, p. 29.

plan to capitalize on these characteristics to form a partisan uprising in an invader's rear area.

Thus, the factors that contribute most to a partisan movement have been established. These are the constituents of the latent threat to the field army service area.

Response

The army support brigade commander conducts phase I rear area security operations within the limits of current doctrine. He assigns the area damage control center (ADCOC) the mission of receiving, recording, and disseminating rear area security information; and the assistant chief of staff for security, plans, and operations is assigned general staff supervision of rear area security matters.[5] In addition, the local security plans of each unit and installation are reviewed for adequacy and to insure that they are complete. Warning and communications systems are established and tested, SOP are rehearsed, and key personnel are required to become familiar with the area of operations.[6]

Recognizing the potential threat, the army support brigade commander institutes measures within his capabilities that are designed to counter the constituents of this menace. All units in the FASA are assigned specific locations that: are suitable for their operations, reach a compromise between dispersion for nuclear vulnerability and close proximity for mutual support, and prevent interference with each other. The combat service support units are generally located along major road and rail arteries; while the combat support units occupy terrain suitable for their missions. The net result of this dispersion is to deny some areas

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[5] FM 54-4, p. 206.   [6] FM 100-10, p. 45.

to a potential guerrilla band. On the other hand, since the bulk of the installations are along major transportation arteries (whereas partisans perfer the security offered by dense forests and swamps), the units in the FASA deny relatively few areas that are suitable for guerrilla hideouts.

With reference to the factor of bypassed Russian regular army units, the support brigade commander has no forces to bring directly against this potential threat.[7] He does, however, alert rear area units to report any sightings of Soviet soldiers in the rear area; and the support brigade commander requests that locations of bypassed Soviet units be reported to him by tactical units.

Soviet attempts to organize partisan bands consist of aerial supply and liaison, appeals to patriotism, and psychological operations. In the FASA, the support brigade commander counters these attempts by surveillance of drop zones and landing zones and by an effective installation security system to discourage potential partisans.[8] Supply personnel moving throughout the FASA, service elements, aircraft pilots, and maintenance personnel are directed to report any evidence of intrusion that they observe in their movement about the FASA.

The FASCOM commander controls the civil affairs elements, and he directs them to be alert to Soviet attempts at organizing partisans.[9] He also coordinates with army air defense units in order to reduce penetration of the FASA by enemy resupply and liaison aircraft, and he requests that all instances of enemy aerial overflights of the FASA be re-

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[7]Mopping up bypassed units is a decision of the front line commander at each echelon. It is he that must make provisions for this type operation. FM 61-100, p. 88.

[8]FM 54-4, p. 90.   [9]FM 54-4, p. 10.

ported to his headquarters.

The last factor that contributes to the emergence of a partisan movement is harsh and unjust treatment of the people in the occupied territory. This poor treatment stems from an improper occupation policy and from depredations by the forces operating in the occupied area.

The army support brigade commander requires all units in the FASA to instruct their personnel on standards of conduct and proper attitudes. He insists that all soldiers pay for what they obtain from the local inhabitants, and he enforces the policies established by higher headquarters for utilization of civilian labor and for local procurement of supplies. Through orientation and enforcement, the army support brigade commander prevents one aspect of possible poor treatment of civilians from becoming widespread.

Since the FASCOM commander commands the civil affairs group, the army support brigade commander coordinates closely with him to insure that the operating policies of the civil affairs personnel in the FASA are compatible with the rear area security plans. He establishes liaison with the civil affairs personnel to provide him an important link with the attitudes, feelings, and problems of the conquered people. This contact may also be a valuable intelligence source for the army support brigade commander.[10]

Summary

This first phase has exhibited the potential threat of the formation of a partisan movement in the field army service area. The territorial commander, in this case the army support brigade commander, performed

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[10] FM 41-10, pp. 21-22.

his rear area security missions under conditions of a phase I rear area security environment. His response to the potential threat included preparation of rear area security plans and SOP and establishment of a rear area security control center. The army support brigade commander supervised RAS training of units located in the FASA, coordinated their defense plans, and directed their dispersion throughout the FASA.

A discussion of the results of this phase will be presented in the next chapter.

SECOND PHASE--THE GROWING PARTISAN BANDS

Situation

This is a continuation of the previous situation; it is now six weeks later. Neither side has advanced its position; the front lines have changed slightly, but the field army service area remains the same as in the first phase.

Guerrilla raids have increased sharply during the past four weeks. Guerrilla contacts have been reported six out of every seven nights. Targets are ammunition and supply dumps; and tactics have been a surprise night raid, seizure of supplies that can be carried, destruction of the remainder, and then destruction of the installation followed by rapid withdrawal into forests and swamps.

The guerrilla bands operate in groups of twenty-five to sixty persons; and they are armed with rifles, submachine guns, and a few small caliber mortars. Intelligence estimates conclude that there are at least ten different bands of partisans operating in the FASA.

Until a week ago, partisan activities appeared to have the objective of securing food, clothing, and weapons for their own use. During

the past week, however, partisan attacks have been aimed at interrupting rail and communications facilities and ambushing small military movements.

Threat

The situation above depicts one aspect of the threat; namely, the current operations of the partisan bands. Another, and equally significant element of the total menace to the field army service area is the potential growth of the budding partisan movement to suc' a degree that it endangers the command as a whole. Consider previous evidence.

There are several factors that influence the growth of a partisan movement. Some were considered in the first phase and apply similarly in this phase. It was concluded in chapter 1 that the following were important considerations influencing the growth of the Russian Partisan Movement:

(1) weak German anti-partisan operations resulting in only limited success or actual failure,[11]

(2) German reliance on passive defensive measures to protect their rear areas.

Soviet current doctrine exploits these factors. Civilians are considered to be well trained in military operations and are therefore a source of strength to be called upon by the Soviets.[12] Weak anti-partisan operations by the occupying forces provide a psychological weapon which the Soviets fully intend to use to encourage partisan bands.

The Soviets recognize the vulnerability of enemy rear areas.

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[11] Weinberg, The Partisan Movement in the Yelna . . . , 34-36.

[12] Sokolovskii, Soviet Military Strategy, 461.

Hence, an invader relying on the passive measures of dispersion, installation security, and forces designed for relief of besieged installations rather than actively attacking guerrilla strongholds will soon experience a "partisan front."[13]

The threat to the field army service area in this second phase, therefore, consists of the actual guerrilla activities occurring frequently throughout the area and the potential growth of the bands due to the presence of certain contributing factors. Next, consider the actions of the rear area commander.

Response

The organization of the army support brigade contains no tactical units designed for combat operations.[14] Therefore, the army support brigade commander requests from FASCOM the assignment of tactical units for rear area security operations in the FASA. The FASCOM commander forwarded the request to the field army commander. In view of the threat, the field army commander decided to attach an armored cavalry regiment to FASCOM. This was accomplished by diverting the cavalry regiment from its mission as part of the field army reserve.

The FASCOM commander further attached the armored cavalry regiment to the army support brigade. The army support brigade commander divided the field army service area into two subareas, assigning one general support group commander responsibility for each of the subareas (Fig. 2). He also attached one squadron of the armored cavalry regiment to each of the two general support groups to provide the subarea commanders

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[13] Colonel Nemo, "The Place of Guerrilla Action in War," Military Review, XXXVII November, 1957, pp. 99-107.

[14] FM 54-4, p. 10.

Figure 2

a combat force. The remainder of the armored cavalry regiment was re-
tained under army support brigade control to be used as a mobile strik-
ing force throughout the FASA.

Each general support group commander decides to employ his ar-
mored cavalry squadron in three roles: (1) area patrol and surveillance,
(2) mobile striking force to relieve installations under attack, and (3)
escort force to protect convoys and administrative troop movements.

The army support brigade commander conducts inspections of rear
area security activities, and directs the subarea commanders to accomplish
all possible reconnaissance of likely partisan camps. He plans for the
employment of the armored cavalry regiment reserve force in an anti-par-
tisan role against any bands whose size permits some assurance of success.
His plans avoid too great a reliance on purely passive defensive measures.
The army support brigade commander further coordinates with civil affairs
personnel to develop a better intelligence resource. He also requests
that psychological warfare units be made available for operations in the
FASA to aid civil affairs and his own forces in combatting the factors
that could lead to any escalation of guerrilla activity or growth of the
partisan bands.[15]

Since the two subareas are each approximately 25,000 square
kilometers in rea, the army support brigade commander requests permis-
sion to use chemical warfare (CW) and biological warfare (BW) in his anti-
partisan operations to extend the capabilities of the rear area security
forces.[16] This request requires decision at the highest level (theater
army or higher) since this type warfare has not been employed by U. S. for-
ces in this campaign. If permission to use CW and BW is granted, the army

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[15]FM 33-5, p. 132.   [16]FM 3-5, p. 88 and p. 102.

support brigade commander would employ these methods to deny terrain as
well as to aid in anti-partisan offensive operations.

Summary

The threat in this second phase consisted of frequent guerrilla
attacks against the units in the FASA and the potential growth of the
partisan movement. The rear area commander acted to defend against the
guerrilla attacks and to counter the factors that contribute to the growth
of a partisan movement by implementing phase II rear area security opera-
tions.

In this case, combat forces were diverted to a rear area security
role, the FASA was divided into subareas using the two general support
group commanders as subarea commanders, and the tactical troops were at-
tached to the subarea. Coordination with civil affairs was accomplished,
and a request for psychological warfare operations was submitted. Finally,
permission to use chemical and biological warfare was requested.

As before, a discussion of this phase will be deferred until
chapter V.

THIRD PHASE-PARTISANS JEOPARDIZE THE ARMY

Situation

It is six weeks later. The army rear boundary has moved forward
approximately 100 miles, but the nature of the area of operations in the
field army service area remains the same.

Large, well-coordinated attacks by partisan units occur frequently
throughout the FASA and into the communications zone (COMMZ). The parti-
sans are organized along military lines into companies, battalions, and

brigades.[17] Three brigades of approximately 1000 men each have been identified. They exhibit a high degree of training and leadership: they are aware of the movement of U. S. forces throughout the FASA, and they act as a source of information to the Soviets.

Partisan units have added light artillery weapons to their inventory. On three occasions partisans are known to have used atomic demolition munitions (ADM) and are now being equipped with gas masks. Their attacks against targets in the field army rear, coordinated with Soviet frontline operations, jeopardize the field army's accomplishment of its mission.

Threat

The evidence of World War II reinforced by Soviet current capabilities indicate that in a situation like the one outlined above, partisans are most successful in conducting raids against critical rear area installations and in acquiring intelligence for the Soviets. Using guerrilla techniques, the partisans destroy rail nets, disrupt communications facilities, and transmit enemy information to the Red Army. Not as important, but nevertheless significant, the partisan bands provide a base of operations for clandestine activities by trained Soviet agents. Also, partisan bands punish those indigenous people who support or collaborate with the invader. Acting under the close direction of the Soviets, maximum partisan efforts occur in conjunction with major Red Army frontline operations.

Response

The field army commander decides that the size of the partisan

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[17]De Witt and Moll, The Partisan Movement in the Bryansk . . . , 13.

uprising endangers the command as a whole. He therefore diverts an infantry division from front line operations to counterguerrilla operations in the army rear. The infantry division is relieved from attachment to one of the corps and ordered to operate under field army control in the FASA.[18] The mission assigned to the infantry division is to locate partisan organizations, destroy them, and keep the partisans off balance. The division is reinforced with sufficient ground transportation to move four battalions simultaneously and with enough helicopters to airlift one battalion.

The armored cavalry regiment remains attached to the army support brigade and the general support groups. This regiment continues to be employed in the roles of convoy escort, route and installation security, and local reaction force for relief of attacked installations. The surveillance capabilities of the armored cavalry regiment are directed toward locating guerrilla concentrations. Any discovered bands are reported through army support brigade to FASCOM, then to field army headquarters who will provide the information to the infantry division having responsibility for anti-partisan operations.

The infantry division commander initially directs his efforts to the task of locating guerrillas. The division commander employs aircraft, radar, patrols, and observation posts to find guerrilla concentrations. He coordinates closely with civil affairs personnel to take advantage of informers or other information leaks from the civilian population. He coordinates also with air defense elements since much outside guerrilla support must come from aerial supply missions infiltrating the field army service area. Having received authority to employ chemical

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[18] FM 100-10, p. 40.

warfare,[19] the infantry division commander uses chemical agents to contaminate remote areas in the forests and swamps—areas that are useless except as partisan camps.

When guerrilla concentrations are located, the division employs some of its battalions to isolate the force by encirclement. The destruction of the partisans is achieved using other battalions to conduct airmobile assaults while the battalions of the encircling force reduce the size of the perimeter in a squeezing action.[20] Chemical agents are used in conjunction with the assault elements to force the enemy to move from his defensive positions and to destroy his will to fight.[21] Partisans who escape are pursued to complete the destruction of the organization as an effective partisan unit.[22]

Summary

This third phase situation exhibited a partisan rear area threat that endangered the mission of the field army. An infantry division was diverted from its front line tasks to a counterguerrilla mission in the FASA. The infantry division was employed under field army control; but the army support brigade commander retained the armored cavalry regiment for rear area security missions in the FASA. Authority was given to the

[19]Permission to employ chemical agents was given to the infantry division commander subject to the following conditions: (1) no contamination of villages or cultivated areas; (2) downwind vapor hazzard limited to one kilometer; and (3) each use must be coordinated with the army support brigade commander and receive specific approval of field army headquarters.

[20]FM 57-35, p. 36. The number of battalions employed in the encircling force and the airmobile force will vary depending upon the strength of the enemy and the nature of the terrain. The encircling force will require a much greater force than the airmobile force.

[21]FM 3-5, p. 38.   [22]FM 31-16, p. 21

infantry division commander to employ chemical warfare under certain restrictions.

A rear area security test model has been presented in three phases, each phase describing a level of threat or potential threat in an environment of a general war. The commanders exercising territorial jurisdiction in the field army service area employed current rear area security doctrine for guidance in combatting the threat. The results of this test will be discussed in chapter V.

CHAPTER V

APPRAISAL

This chapter has a threefold purpose: first, to discuss the
results of the test model presented in chapter IV; second, to formulate
the conclusions evolved with respect to the adequacy of rear area se-
curity doctrine; and third, to recommend changes and areas for study
with the objective of strengthening the doctrine for security of the
field army service area.

DISCUSSION

The analysis of the test responses and the formulation of cor-
responding conclusions are facilitated by discussing the results of the
test under functional categories rather than model phases. The discus-
sion below, therefore, employs the categories of command and control,
counter-threat measures, and counter-threat means.[1]

Command and Control

One important aspect of rear area security doctrine is the assign-
ment of territorial responsibility for the field army service area. In
the first phase model, the field army commander assigned territorial re-
sponsibility for the FASA to the field army support command commander who

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[1]Chart 8 reviews the highlights of the test model by phases. It is
provided as a foldout for use in the discussion to follow to facilitate
the transition from phases to functional categories.

PHASES	PARAMETERS OF THE THREAT			
	WW II Russian Partisan Movement		Current Soviet Doctrine	
Phase I— Birth of a Partisan Movement	1. Favorable terrain 2. Bypassed enemy units 3. Soviet organizational and support activities 4. Poor German occupation policies		1. Use of favorable terrain 2. Trapped units taught to disperse, fight as partisans 3. Airborne forces trained for rear area and partisan missions 4. Strong Communist Party control and large pool of trained civilians 5. Soviets plan to use partisan	1. Orga 2. Lodg
Phase II— Growth of the Partisan Bands	1. Same as above 2. Weak German anti-partisan operations resulting in only limited success or actual failure 3. German reliance on passive defensive measures to protect their rear areas		1. Same as above 2. Infiltration by ground and air 3. Close control of guerrilla actions 4. Pressure exerted on civilians to join and support the partisans	1. Orga 2. Lodg 3. Arm Re
Phase III Large Scale Partisan Movement	1. Raids against installations 2. Disrupt rail and road nets 3. Cut communications facilities 4. Transmit military information to the Soviets 5. Operate in conjunction with front line actions		1. Soviets profit from WW II experiences 2. People trained during peacetime for guerrilla warfare 3. Strong Communist Party control	1. Orga 2. Lodg 3. Arm Re 4. Infa

		US Resources		US Doctrine
REAR AREA SECURITY OF FASA				
·ine in o disperse. I for rear ssions \ control ned civil- rtisan	1. 2.	Organic units Lodger units	1. 2. :. 1. 5.	Dispersion to deny terrain Tactical doctrine may provide for follow and support units Preparation of plans. SOP. reaction forces, installation security, and anti-airborne plans. Coordination with army air defense elements. Apply CA activities. psychological warfare. fair wages. medical care. Army support brigade commander assigned RAS responsibility for all of FASA
nd air lla actions \ilians to partisans	1. 2. 5.	Organic units Lodger Units Armored Cavalry Regiment	1. 2. :. 1. 5.	Division of FASA into subareas for RAS. Area patrols. extra surveillance. mobile reserve or reaction force Authority to employ CW requested. Coordination of CA. psychological operations Coordination of anti-air operations.
ll experi- peacetime \ control	1. 2. :. 1.	Organic units Lodger units Armored Cavalry Regiment Infantry Division	1. 2. . 1. 5. 6.	FASA remains divided Army support brigade directs RAS, including Cavalry regiment Infantry division conducts anti-partisan operations under field army control CA and psychological activities are important Coordination with army air defense elements Chemical warfare employed

in turn delegated this responsibility to the army support brigade com-
mander. Thus, the army support brigade commander is made responsible for
rear area security for the entire field army service area. There are
several advantages to this course of action:

(1) the combat service support mission of the support brigade
is oriented in the FASA; whereas the scope of the FASCOM commander's
mission includes the entire field army area;

(2) as the logistic operator for the field army, the FASCOM
commander requires a major subordinate command to perform as his rear
area security operator;

(3) the army support brigade is provided with an appropriate
staff section and an area damage control center that is designed to per-
form a rear area security control mission.[2]
The disadvantages of delegating territorial responsibility of the FASA
to the army support brigade commander are:

(1) approximately 50,000 troops of the 70,000 to 80,000 lodged
in the field army service area are assigned to FASCOM units; whereas only
16,000 troops are assigned to the army support brigade;

(2) the security, plans, and operations staff section of FASCOM
with a complement of forty-six (compared to twenty-one in this staff sec-
tion of the army support brigade) is better equipped to exercise staff
supervision and control of rear area security operations in the FASA;[3]

(3) the support mission of the army support brigade is oriented
only on parts of the FASA, but the FASCOM commander is concerned with all
movements into, within, and out of the entire FASA;

(4) the FASCOM commander (but not the army support brigade com-

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[2]TOE 54-22F, p. 52.   [3]TOE 55-12F, p. 54.

mander) controls civil affairs elements and deals with communications zone commands and corps commands and thus is better suited to provide uniformity and continuity for territorial control.

(5) subdivision of the FASA is not facilitated under army support brigade control (FASCOM could use the military police brigade commander to command one subarea and the army support brigade commander for another);

(6) the army support brigade has no direct contact with field army headquarters for coordinating air defense, psychological warfare, and the use of tactical troops for rear area security.

The consideration that the FASCOM commander has a wider interest than just that of the field army service area is the major advantage to delegation of territorial responsibility to the army support brigade commander. The disadvantages (which are advantages to FASCOM retaining territorial control) outweigh the advantages, however, particularly with respect to command of units, control of integrated resources such as civil affairs and psychological operations, and overall coordination and uniformity of effort. The results of the model and this discussion lead initially to the conclusion that the FASCOM commander should retain territorial control of, and hence rear area security responsibility for, the field army serv area.

Continuing with a discussion of certain other aspects of command and control of rear area security operations, it is noted that the field army SOP annex for rear area security required all units and installations to comply with the directives of the rear area commander. The rear area commander is thus provided the authority to issue instructions to units pertaining to rear area security matters even though there is no actual command relationship. When the situation warranted, the FASA was divided

into subareas to aid in control and responsiveness to the rear area threat. Also, the army support brigade commander employed his area damage control center to control rear area security operations as well as damage control activities, a function for which this element appears to be suitable.[4] Therefore, another conclusion is that preparation of rear area security SOP, installation and unit internal security plans, and the use of an operational control center for rear area security matters are valuable measures in the field army service area.

Counter-threat Measures

Clear Zone.--A very real danger from bypassed enemy units became apparent in the first and the second phases of the model. Since U. S. doctrine no longer requires the frontline division to clear its zone,[5] the menace here becomes clear. For example, assume that in the first phase situation a corps commander planned to clear bypassed enemy units later, and used only blocking forces for a day or two to isolate the enemy units. All or part of the encircled enemy units might decide in the interim that the time had come to follow the Soviet doctrine of breaking up into small elements, escaping, and joining partisan bands.[6] It is therefore important for tactical commanders to assess the impact on their rear area of a tactical plan that does not require clearance of the zone. It is equally important that rear area security planners be familiar with this aspect of the front line plans and resultant operations.

Tactical Tailoring.--The lack of tactical troops for rear area security during the first phase proved to be a serious deficiency. The consequences of

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[4]TOE 54-22F, pp. 52-54, and see also STANAG 2079.

[5]FM 61-100, p. 88   [6]Ely, The Red Army Today, p. 15.

this lack contributed to the problems of the army support brigade commander in several ways:

(1) the army support brigade commander had no effective force to take offensive action against the partisan force which ambushed the convoy;

(2) no force was available for surveillance of possible guerrilla base camp areas;

(3) without combat units, there was little that the army support brigade commander could do to block Soviet attempts to organize partisans;

(4) lack of an effective deterrent in the form of combat troops encouraged civilian support of guerrilla bands in their early stages. Despite the fact that current U. S. doctrine recognizes that "preventing the formation of a resistance movement is much easier than dealing with one after it is formed,"[7] the interpretation of the definition of rear area security[8] has led to the conclusion that combat troops cannot be assigned to rear area security missions until a threat exists. The problem here seems to be the meaning of the word threat. A _potential_ threat, should it become real, undoubtedly will result in a greater cost to the field army than would the assignment of tactical troops for rear area security missions based on realistic estimates of the potential threat.

In the basic model the field army and the corps were tailored by the attachment of combat, combat support, and combat service support units to perform their ground combat missions on a hostile landmass during conditions of general war. The FASCOM also was tailored for its combat serv-

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[7] FM 31-16, p. 20.

[8] FM 100-10, p. 40. The last part of the definition of rear area security is incorrectly applied in the converse which leads one to say that once units are moved from the front lines or the reserve to the rear area, then this is no longer rear area security but a part of the main battle.

ice support mission. It would seem to follow that FASCOM should be tailored as well to perform its rear area security mission. The conclusion based on the above evidence is that rear area commands should be tailored in advance by the assignment of tactical forces for rear area security missions when the potential or the actual threat warrants.

Civil Affairs.--A third specific measure concerns civil affairs. From the first phase through the third phase, civil affairs activities played a vital role in rear area security activities. Civil affairs teams operating throughout the FASA played an important part in implementing occupation policy during the first phase of the model. The rear area commander depended upon their efforts to avoid the World War II German mistakes that contributed greatly to the birth and growth of the Russian Partisan Movement.[9] In all phases, the rear area commanders looked to civil affairs units to keep abreast of civilian attitudes and to obtain local information of military interest.

Civil affairs doctrine for rear area security and counterguerrilla operations is complete.[10] Psychological warfare operations are incorporated with the civil affairs plans.[11] There is a requirement for close coordination between a rear area commander and the civil affairs units operating in his area. In counterguerrilla operations like those of the second and third phases, provision must be made to include "appropriate action against the civilian and underground support of the guerrilla force."[12]

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[9] Ziemke, The Soviet Partisan Movement in 1941, pp. 64-65.

[10] FM 41-10, pp. 145-148.

[11] FM 33-5, pp. 132-154 and FM 41-5, p. 85.

[12] FM 31-16, p. 20.

The results of the test model and the above facts indicate that the territorial commander of the field army service area requires operational command of the civil affairs and psychological warfare teams necessary to exercise control of the occupied parts of his area.

Chemical Warfare.—Another specific measure employed during the third phase was chemical warfare. U. S. Field Service Regulations Operations points out that a general war "is characterized by the absence of restraints and may include . . . chemical and biological attacks . . ."[13] The army support brigade commander's request for authority to employ chemical warfare in the second phase and the granting of this authority to the infantry division counterguerrilla force during the third phase are, therefore, within the realm of possible response. Some considerations favoring the use of chemical agents for rear area operations such as those depicted in the second and third phases are:

(1) guerrillas will not have gas masks (at least initially, and even later resupply will be difficult);

(2) one fighter aircraft using two 100 gallon spray tanks of nerve gas can contaminate an area approximately 1000 meters long and 600 meters wide with an agent whose effects remain for several days;[14]

(3) chemical agent contamination of known and suspected partisan camps results not only in casualties to the partisans but also denies the contaminated area to guerrillas for a period of several days to one week;

(4) the cost to the U. S. in terms of rear area security troop

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[13] FM 100-5, p. 2.

[14] This is based on employing the persistent agent VX and a standard estimate using the chemical agent calculator and the unclassified doctrine contained in U. S. Army Command and General Staff College, RB 3-1, Chemical and Biological Weapons Employment, (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas; May, 1964) p. 12.

requirements, casualties to trained specialists from guerrilla attacks, and
loss of equipment can be reduced;

(5) the impact on world public opinion, the indigenous people,
and U. S. allies must be weighed.

U. S. counterguerrilla tactical doctrine provided for the use of chemical
and biological warfare when authorized.[15] Thus, it is concluded that de-
spite certain psychological disadvantages, the advantages of the employ-
ment of chemical warfare in rear area security missions are significant,
and current chemical warfare doctrine adequately provides for counterguer-
rilla chemical warfare measures.

Air Defense.--The test model responses indicated that air defense of the
field army service area was an important consideration to the territorial
commander, not only as a means of protection from hostile aircraft attack,
but also as a means of preventing aerial resupply and support of the par-
tisans. In the first and second phases, the army support brigade com-
mander coordinated through FASCOM to the field army to provide for compati-
bility of army air defense plans and rear area security plans.[16] While
it is true that enemy air attack of installations in the FASA is a major
concern of the rear area commander, it is equally true that the infiltration
of supply and liaison aircraft into partisan infested areas represents
another danger. The integrated army air defense system of the field army
area is based upon the Nike Hercules and the Hawk surface-to-air missiles.[17]
Operating under centralized control and decentralized execution, this
system has the mission of destroying enemy airborne objects.[18] It is a

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[15]FM 3-5, p. 88 and p. 102.   [16]FM 44-1, p. 42 and p. 49.

[17]Subject A2445, U. S. Army Command and General Staff College,
p. L2-III-2.

[18]FM 44-96, pp. 56-57.

fact, nevertheless, that infiltration by low-flying enemy aircraft into the FASA, singly, and under conditions of reduced visibility is feasible. Consequently, there is a requirement for some type of ground anti-aircraft weapon to be employed under the control of rear area security forces to deny drop and landing zones and to bring effective fire to bear on hostile aircraft attempting to resupply partisans or land small organizing detachments. This conclusion implicitly negates the part of rear area security doctrine that excludes active air defense from the definition of rear area security operations.[19]

Counter-threat Means

Having been delegated territorial responsibility for the field army service area, the army support brigade commander's resources for rear area security operation during the first phase consisted essentially of two general support groups and two direct support groups.[20] The primary mission assigned these support groups is combat service support, and there are no organic rear area security forces in either the general or the direct support group.[21] Therefore, with respect to rear area security, the army support brigade commander did not employ the direct or general support groups initially for other than preparing and coordinating local installation security plans for their subordinate units. The area damage control center located in the army support brigade headquarters served as the focal point for all information pertaining to unit locations, internal security plans, and capabilities of each installation to aid another in the event that the one is attacked by enemy ground elements. The advance preparation of SOP, plans for local unit and installation se-

[19]FM 100-10, p. 40.   [20]FM 54-4, p. 10.

[21]CO-STAR II (2d Rev), p. K-9, and p. L-11.

curity, contingency plans to relieve attacked installations, and the incorporation of tenant units in FASA into each aspect of rear area security requires the full effort of the security, plans, and operations staff section of the army support brigade including the area damage control center.

During the second phase and continuing through the third phase of the model, an armored cavalry regiment was attached to the army support brigade and further attached in part to the subarea commander. The level of partisan activity in the second phase, together with the size of the field army service area, forced the army support brigade commander to subdivide the FASA and attach to each subarea one of the cavalry squadrons. Figure 2 illustrates schematically that each subarea of the FASA contains approximately 25,000 square kilometers; therefore, the cavalry squadron in each subarea was employed in defensive rather than offensive roles in order to be able to react over such a large area.[22]

Still referring to the armored cavalry regiment, the model response demonstrated that although the cavalry regiment was a valuable counterthreat means, its assignment came too late to be a deterrent thus forcing its use primarily in a reaction role. Equally important, the test model indicated that the field army commander was forced to sacrifice a part of his maneuver force (the armored cavalry regiment) with a consequent adverse impact on his tactical plans. Doctrine provides no replacement to the field army for this type of loss.

Finally, during the third phase, an infantry division was detached

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[22]FM 17-37, pp. 241-242. Current doctrine provides for piecemeal use of cavalry units in rear area security operations because immediate reaction is so important.

from a front line corps and assigned a counterguerrilla mission in the
FASA under control of the field army. It is clear that the partisan
threat warranted the diversion of this much combat power to the rear
area. Further, the brigades of the infantry division are capable of per-
forming counterguerrilla operations.[23] In this connection, however, note
that the division was employed under field army control while the FASA
remained divided and under army support brigade control for rear area
security operations. U. S. doctrine provides for tactical operations in
the rear area to be controlled by field army when the threat "endangers
the command as a whole."[24] Nevertheless, while the infantry division may
require several days and all its combat units to destroy one guerrilla
brigade, the rest of the FASA will need protection from other partisan
units to permit the combat service support units to perform their mission.
This argues for split responsibility in the FASA like that which occurred
in the model. On the other hand, the counterguerrilla operations of the
infantry division will require it to move freely throughout FASA thus ne-
cessitating close coordination with rear area security and combat service
support elements. This aspect favors a unity of command in the rear area
even under the difficult requirements of the third phase. Considering
that the field army is fighting a major battle at the front and planning
for the next operation, it is concluded that an overall rear area commander
should be in command of all forces operating in the field army service
area. This assessment is in consonance with a similar observation de-
scribed earlier during the discussion of command and control.

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[23]FM 7-30, p. 200.

[24]FM 100-10, p. 40. This type of action is no longer rear area
security per se; it is a part of the main battle.

CONCLUSIONS

The stated purpose of this paper is to evaluate the adequacy of rear area security doctrine in the field army service area. The results of this investigation have revealed both adequacies and inadequacies, and the same results have offered certain clues for remedies with respect to the inadequate areas.

Rear area security doctrine in the field army service area is adequate in the following respect:

(1) the requirement for all units in the FASA to prepare unit and local installation plans, and the provisions for coordinating these plans throughout the FASA;

(2) the preparation, rehearsal, and standardization of rear area security standing operating procedures at all echelons;

(3) the tactical doctrine for combat units when they are assigned to rear area security tasks;

(4) the doctrine for civil affairs activities and psychological warfare operations designed to support rear area security and counterguerrilla operations;

(5) the provision for integrating units lodged in the FASA (but not actual ʳ under the command of the rear area commander) into rear area security plans.

The inadequacies of current rear area security doctrine are divided into two categories: general rear area security doctrine; and doctrine peculiar to the field army service area.

With respect to the former, a basic weakness is the definition of rear area security. The errors here are: the exclusion of active air defense; the ambiguity which results in misinterpretation of "enemy threats

large enough to endanger the command"; and the phasing of rear area security into a sort of pre-incident, post incident activity leading to the concept of "no combat elements for rear area security until forced to assign them." Large scale vertical envelopments and deep penetrations are properly considered outside the scope of rear area security; however, other diversion of combat power to the rear areas to combat a continuing threat is a part of rear area security operations.

In addition to the definition, another inadequacy of rear area security doctrine is its failure to provide for a single commander to have not only territorial responsibility for a given area but also the command of civil affairs teams, psychological warfare elements, and tactical troops to accomplish his area mission.

The second category of inadequate rear area security doctrine applies specifically to the field army service area. There are two weaknesses under the current CO-STAR concept: one is the delegation of territorial responsibility for the entire FASA to the army support brigade; the other is the lack of published doctrine designed to provide for integrated rear area security measures in the FASA. The discussions presented earlier under the functional categories of command and control and counterthreat measures support these conclusions.

Recapitulating, rear area security doctrine is inadequate with respect to the following:

        (1) the definition of rear area security,

        (2) timely provision for the use of combat units,

        (3) unity of command of all the requisite resources,

        (4) providing for the most effective command echelon in the field army service area.

APPENDIX I

AREAS FOR FUTURE STUDY

The following areas for study emerged from this thesis as cerebrations and are not fully supported by research. Their presentation here is made in the hope that they will stimulate further investigation of rear area security doctrine.

(1) Change the definition of rear area security. Specifically, divide the doctrine for security of rear areas into two distinct (although allied) doctrines.

(a) One doctrine, to be called rear area security, is designed for operations on a non-hostile landmass. It should be similar to the current definition of rear area security. It should specify unity of command and use of indigenous paramilitary and civil police; and it should not require the assignment of combat units for rear area missions unless an emergency arises.

(b) Another doctrine, defined as rear area defense, is designed for operations on a hostile landmass. This concept should provide for timely assignment of combat troops according to the potential threat in the area of operations. Rear area defense forces should be placed under one commander, should include civil affairs teams, psychological warfare units, and some air defense units, and should provide for uniformity and continuity of policy as the boundaries of the field army service area change. This concept should be studied in the light of current weapons, surveillance capabilities, and transportation means; and the results should be evaluated by war gaming.

(2) Conduct a cost effectiveness study to evaluate the relative

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cost of assigning combat units to rear area security on the basis of potential threat.

This study should weigh such parameters as the relative cost of preventing an uprising by using tactical troops versus the cost of subduing one after it occurs; the cost of risking the loss of some of the highly skilled technicians normally found in rear area; the impact on COMMZ of ineffective preventive measures in the FASA; the requirement for a uniform occupation policy in FASA and the COMMZ; and the increased danger of partisan attacks when partisans are equipped with modern weapons.

(3) Revise the CO-STAR concept so that the field army support command commander retains territorial responsibility for the field army service area.

APPENDIX II

Annex L (Army Rear Area Defense)
to Part I to Seventh Army Field SOP

1. General: a. This annex prescribes procedures for organization, planning, and operations in the Seventh Army Rear against guerrillas, saboteurs, and airborne forces. It applies to all units and installations located therein. Seventh Army technical service units, physically located outside Seventh Army Rear, will support rear area security programs of headquarters responsible for the area in which located.

b. Commanding General, Seventh Army Support Command is responsible for defense operations in the Army Rear Area.

2. Abbreviations and Definitions: a. SECOM. Security Command. A headquarters organized to plan and coordinate defense activities within a designated sector of the Army Rear Area.

b. COMSECOM. Commander, Security Command

c. WBK. Wehrbereichskommando. A German Military District Headquarters

d. TV. Territorial Verteidigungstab. A subdistrict of WBK, generally performing the same functions as a SECOM

3. Application: This annex applies except when modified by rear area defense plans.

4. Operations: a. The Commanding General, Support Command will:

(1) Organize, plan, and direct defense of the Army Rear Area.

(2) Retain sole authority in the Seventh Army Rear for contact with WBK regarding rear area defense and security matters.

(3) Organize and direct ground defense of the Army Rear Area.

(4) Coordinate with US Army, Air Force, and NATO units in rear area defense planning.

(5) Keep Commanding General, Seventh Army informed of enemy activity in the Army Rear Area.

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b. Each SECOM Commander will:

(1) Coordinate area defense and security planning and utilization of local assets with German TV.

(2) Report attack by or build up of enemy guerrilla, airborne, or partisan forces in area to Headquarters, Seventh Army Support Command, adjacent units, and WBK subdistricts (TV).

(3) Submit requests for use of defense forces to Headquarters, Seventh Army Support Command.

(4) Submit all requests for local German assistance to German WBK subdistricts (TV).

(5) Maintain a current listing of units and installations located within areas of responsibility.

c. Each unit and installation commander will:

(1) Comply with directives and instructions promulgated by Commanding General, Support Command as pertains to rear area defense.

(2) Provide own local security.

(3) Report CP location to SECOM Headquarters when entering, leaving, or changing location within a SECOM area.

(4) Comply, except medical units, consistent with continuation of unit operational mission, with request of SECOM Headquarters to provide personnel and equipment for rear area defense missions.

(5) Submit requests for assistance to SECOM Commanders. No requests will be made directly to German civilian or military agencies.

d. Each ordnance, engineer, transportation, and quartermaster group be prepared to assume the functions of a SECOM Headquarters on order.

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